THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 27, 2003

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

MARCH 27, 2003

Grossman, Hon. Marc I., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs ............. 5
Feith, Hon. Douglas J., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy ......................... 17

(III)
THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

THURSDAY, MARCH 27, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman) presiding.


Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff director; and Gabriella Eisen, nominations clerk.

Majority staff members present: Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; and Scott W. Stucky, general counsel.

Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic staff director; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Jeremy L. Hekhuis, professional staff member; Maren R. Leed, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel; Peter K. Levine, minority counsel; and Christina D. Still, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell, Andrew Kent, Jennifer Key, and Nicholas W. West.

Committee members’ assistants present: Darren Dick, assistant to Senator Roberts; Jayson Roehl, assistant to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator Collins; D’Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Richard Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; and Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator INHOFE [presiding]. The meeting will come to order. In the absence of our chairman, Senator Warner, I will go ahead and just read the first paragraph of his statement and just to welcome you folks, turn it over to Senator Levin, and then be prepared for your opening statements.

The committee meets today to receive testimony on the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from Ambassador Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The commit-
tee regrets that General James Jones, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and the Commander of the U.S. European Command, is unable to be here today due to his responsibilities with respect to the ongoing war.

Let me just say this. I am going to go ahead and, without objection, enter this into the record in its entirety. I know that Senator Warner is concerned, Secretary Feith, with some of the things I have talked to you about before, this new relationship, the evolving, the changing relationships that we have with the European Union (EU), the question, do you have to be anti-American to join the EU? So I hope that you will cover some of these things in your opening statement.

With that, I will enter this in the record and recognize the ranking member, Senator Levin.

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

The committee meets today to receive testimony on the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from Ambassador Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; and Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The committee regrets that General James Jones, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and the Commander of the U.S. European Command, is unable to be here today due to his responsibilities with respect to the ongoing war in Iraq.

Both of our witnesses are well known to this committee. I want to thank them for their service to our Nation.

Today's hearing will focus on the future roles and mission of NATO. NATO remains, first and foremost, a military alliance—the most successful military alliance in history. Today, the threats to NATO member nations do not come from NATO's periphery. There is no Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact. The threats—such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—are transnational in nature, and emanate from regions outside of Europe.

This was recognized in the Strategic Concept adopted at the 50th Anniversary Summit held in Washington in 1999. The Strategic Concept envisioned "out of area" operations for NATO and specifically noted the emergence of non-traditional threats including terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

To remain a viable military alliance, NATO must remain relevant to current threats. More than a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO remains an organization in transition. NATO faces political and technical challenges as it seeks to define its role for the future and simultaneously expand its membership.

I note that yesterday in Brussels, NATO members signed accession protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty for seven countries—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Assuming the accession protocols are ratified by all 19 NATO members, these seven countries will become members of NATO.

The Senate will soon be asked to fulfill its constitutional duty to provide advice and consent to this proposed amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty.

During this upcoming Senate debate, we will examine a number of key questions. First, will these seven nations enhance the military effectiveness of the alliance? The technical challenge that has been facing NATO for some time is that of the growing capabilities gap between the United States and many of the other NATO members. We must consider whether this gap could be exacerbated by the addition of these seven new members.

Second, what has been NATO's experience with integrating the three members that joined the Alliance in 1999—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic? That experience should inform our consideration of this next round of enlargement.

Finally, and most importantly, should NATO consider changing its operating procedures so that it is not, in all cases, bound to act by consensus? The recent divisive debate over planning for the defense of Turkey in the event of war with Iraq demonstrated that it has become more difficult to achieve consensus in NATO. In part, this is because respective NATO members have different views about today's threats and how best to respond to them. Achieving consensus is likely to become even more complex if, and when, NATO's membership expands from the current 19 to as many as 26 nations.
On a separate, but related, matter, Senators Levin, Roberts, Rockefeller, and I had the pleasure of meeting with General Jones not long ago in London, where he shared with us his ideas about possible changes to the number and structure of U.S. forces in Europe. The committee has a great deal of interest in this subject and would welcome hearing from Secretary Feith about the current state of DOD thinking on this matter. We will also reschedule a hearing for General Jones to present his views to the committee, as soon as practical.

We welcome our witnesses this morning and look forward to their testimony.

Senator Levin.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Since our hearing of last February, a lot of events have taken place relative to NATO, within the NATO alliance or in cooperation between NATO and the European Union. For instance, NATO decided at the Prague Summit in November of 2002 to invite Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to begin accession talks to join the alliance, and just yesterday those seven countries signed their accession protocols, which will now be submitted to NATO capitals for ratification.

Next Monday the EU will take over the follow-on mission to the NATO mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia that provided protection to international monitors overseeing the implementation of the peace plan. The EU’s follow-on mission in Macedonia, which is being accomplished pursuant to the EU’s European security and defense policy, has been enabled by the NATO-EU Framework Agreement under which there is assured EU access to NATO operational planning, the presumption of availability to the EU of NATO capabilities and common assets, and the European role of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), Admiral Feist of Germany, who in this case will be the operational commander of the EU-led operation. The ground commander will be a French general.

The EU previously took over the police mission in Bosnia from the United Nations on January 13, the EU’s first civilian crisis management operation, and has expressed its willingness to take over the mission of the NATO-led Stabilization Force there early in 2004.

NATO has been carrying out patrolling and surveillance activities in the eastern Mediterranean since October 2001, after September 11, under Operation Active Endeavor. As an extension of Operation Active Endeavor, NATO warships earlier this month took on a new mission of escorting allied civilian ships through the Straits of Gibraltar, and last month Germany and The Netherlands took over command of the International Security and Assistance Force in Afghanistan, where France is working hand in hand with the United States and Britain to establish and train the Afghan national army.

Now, while those events are positive, there are a number of developments on the negative side of the ledger. The differences among NATO members and the U.N. Security Council over the issue of Iraq carried over into the North Atlantic Council when Turkey invoked article 4 of the Washington Treaty and the Council could not reach consensus on the timetable for military planning.
By resorting to NATO’s Defense Planning Committee, from which France has excluded itself, the alliance was finally able to reach consensus at a team to commence planning for the defense of Turkey. Pursuant to that planning, NATO has deployed surveillance aircraft and missile defenses to assist in Turkey’s deployment in Operation Display Deterrence.

Reportedly, a dispute is developing at the U.N. Security Council over new resolutions dealing with coalition control over and use of Oil for Food money for Iraq’s reconstruction.

Finally on the negative side, there is a continuing problem of the gap between the military capabilities of the United States and its NATO partners. That gap is graphically illustrated by the fact that America’s annual defense budget is now nearly double that of the 18 other NATO countries combined, that while the seven invited countries are striving to hold military spending at 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), Germany’s military spending, for instance, last year was just 1.5 percent of its GDP.

In February of last year at our first hearing on the future of NATO, I said that, “depending on whom you talk to, NATO’s glass is either half-full or half-empty.” I went on to say that I am from the glass is half-full camp. I remain in that camp, but it is going to take a good deal of hard work, dedicated diplomacy, and good faith on both sides of the Atlantic for the damage done to our relations with a number of our NATO allies and perhaps to the alliance to be overcome.

Napoleon was reported to have said the only thing worse than fighting in a coalition is fighting against one. Because of the advantages that accrue from participation in an alliance, including the legitimacy that comes from decisions reached by 19 sovereign nations and soon by 26 sovereign nations, I believe that all concerned will work to overcome the problems that now face the alliance.

But having said that, I want to restate a belief that I have stated before, that the enlargement of NATO to 26 nations and the difficulties that came from the need for consensus to even plan for the defense of Turkey require that we examine some major NATO issues. For example, does the alliance need a mechanism for the suspension of a NATO member nation that is no longer committed to the alliance’s fundamental values—democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. I believe it does and have believed that for a long time.

Additionally, should the unwillingness of one NATO member to agree with all the other member nations and thus precluding a consensus be allowed to prevent the alliance from taking action? I believe we have to find a way to overcome that potential problem.

I look forward to our witnesses’ testimony on these and other issues and I join our chairman in welcoming both of them here today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator.

We now turn to our witnesses. Ambassador Grossman, we will start with you.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARC I. GROSSMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Ambassador Grossman. Senator Inhofe, Senator Levin, thank you very much, members of the committee. As always, it is an honor for both Under Secretary Feith and me to be here today.

May I make two introductory comments first of all to convey the sympathies on behalf of the Department of State and I am sure of the Department of Defense as well on the passing of Senator Moynihan; and second also, before we do anything else, to thank you on behalf of the men and women of the State Department for the support that you give to us and to our diplomacy. We appreciate that very much. It is extremely important.

As Senator Levin has just recalled, Doug and I were here 11 months ago to outline a vision for the future of NATO. I will say that, thanks to the strong support we received from this committee and from many other members of Congress, allied heads of state and government last November in Prague adopted this vision and launched what I would consider to be an historic transformation of the alliance.

President Bush spoke to some students in Prague the night before the alliance got together and he said that the alliance would—and I quote here—"make the most significant reforms NATO has seen since 1949, reforms which will allow the alliance to effectively confront new dangers."

If I could just take a moment or two to answer the question that you all put to us in your letter of invitation about what is the future of NATO and is this alliance still an important part of the defense of the United States, I say first that for 50 years NATO has been the anchor of western security, and the end of Soviet communism did not diminish NATO's importance.

The democracies of NATO made and keep the peace in the Balkans. In 1999, NATO stopped ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. As Senator Levin said in his opening remarks, NATO is completing a mission in Macedonia at the end of this month that has brought order to this new democracy.

NATO responded to September 11 by invoking article 5: An attack on one member regarded as an attack on all. NATO sent Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) to patrol defense air space, logging 4,300 hours, 360 sorties, with 800 crew members from 13 different nations. As Senator Levin pointed out, NATO naval forces are still very active in this effort against terrorism.

Thirteen NATO allies contribute to Operation Enduring Freedom. NATO allies are part of and lead the International Stabilization Force in Kabul. As the ranking member said, German and Dutch troops replaced Turkish forces in International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), who in turn had replaced British forces. Lord Robertson and some of our NATO allies would like to see NATO take a larger role in ISAF and this certainly makes sense to me.

I would say, Senator Levin, in “half-full, half-empty,” that I consider NATO still to be the central organizing agent for transatlantic cooperation, because it represents not just our military ties with these countries, but, also what I would consider to be a real community of values and shared commitment to democracy, free
markets, and the rule of law, and those are extremely important parts of the glue that holds this alliance together. Because I believe that NATO is the key to defense of the United States I also believe that NATO must continue to lead and also to adapt.

Mr. Chairman, members, last year, 11 months ago, we agreed and I think we would still agree today that the gap in military capabilities that Senator Levin talked about and many of you have also mentioned between the United States and Europe is the most serious long-term problem facing the alliance. I am pleased to say that at the Prague Summit last November, NATO's leaders decided to do something to close this gap.

They put forward what they called the Prague Capabilities Commitment. It contains all of the ideas that we discussed when we were together 11 years ago, that you called for, because European allies agreed to spend smarter, pool their resources, and pursue specialization. Let me give you a couple of examples.

First, Germany is now leading a 10-nation consortium to get more airlift. Seven NATO nations are participating in another consortium to get more sealift. The Netherlands is taking the lead on precision-guided missiles and has committed $84 million to equip their F–16s with smart bombs. I would report to you that this is a good start, but that much, much more follow-through will be critical to the success of this initiative.

The other part of the Prague Capabilities Commitment was to create a NATO response force. We believed and I testified and Doug testified at that time that we were in favor of having NATO forces equipped with new capabilities and organized into highly-ready land, air, and sea forces able to carry out missions anywhere in the world, because we believe that NATO can and, where appropriate, should undertake military operations outside its traditional area.

The NATO response force will be a force of approximately 25,000 troops, with land, sea, and air capability, deployable worldwide on 30 days' notice. NATO's leaders at Prague agreed that this response force should be ready for exercises by October 2004 and mission-ready by October 2006. NATO also decided at that Prague summit that it was time to streamline the NATO command structure, and when allied defense ministers get together in June they will consider a leaner and we believe more responsive, more modern command structure.

Mr. Chairman, we also spoke 11 months ago about our determination to extend NATO membership to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. As Senator Levin just said, at the Prague summit, NATO leaders invited Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to join NATO. This invitation followed intensive work on the part of NATO and certainly on the part of these seven nations through NATO's membership action plan. The alliance worked with all of the aspirants to encourage political, economic, and military reform.

Since Prague, the seven invitees have been working even harder with NATO, and yesterday, as Senator Levin mentioned, presented and signed the accession protocols to join the alliance. I would report to you that I spoke this morning to Ambassador Burns and he said it was a tremendous event, and one of the things that made
it so important was that each foreign minister of the countries that
signed paid special tribute to the U.S. Congress for their support
for their membership and for their protocols. So we will be sending
these protocols to you for your advice and consent and I hope that,
after real debate and conversation, that you will support them.

I believe, Senators, that the accession of these seven countries is
about the future of NATO and will be good and directly benefit
U.S. interests. Why? They are strong Atlanticists. They are allies
in the war on terror. They have already contributed to Operation
Enduring Freedom and to the International Security and Stabiliza-
tion Force in Kabul.

I had a chart done up and, since I do not believe that testimony
should be eye charts, I apologize; this chart is too small. But I have
given you each one in front of you. It takes you through the mili-
tary contributions that our invitees have already made in the Bal-
kans, in the war in Afghanistan, in Operation Enduring Freedom,
cooperation in Iraq, cooperation on post-conflict and reconstruction.

[The information referred to follows:]
## 2002 Defense Spending (Percentage of GDP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Inive Average**: 2.1

**NATO Average**: 2.1

---

1. Sources: 2003 USG estimates; President's Report to Congress on NATO Enlargement.
2. Yearly data has been rounded to one decimal place.
   Averages and % Change calculated using non-rounded data.
3. Does not include data for Iceland.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Contributions in the Balkans</th>
<th>Contributions to the War in Afghanistan (ISAF and OEF)</th>
<th>Contributions made to the Coalition to Disarm Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom</th>
<th>Potential contributions Post-Conflict and Reconstruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>• Provides 185 personnel to SFOR&lt;br&gt;• Provides 42 personnel to KPOR&lt;br&gt;• Provides one transport AN-26 aircraft</td>
<td>• OEF: Hosted deployment of six US KC-135 aircraft and 200 support personnel at Burgas&lt;br&gt;• OEF: Granted blanket over-flight rights, ports/bases access, refueling assistance and increased law-enforcement cooperation&lt;br&gt;• ISAF: Deployed nuclear, biological and chemical decontamination unit to Afghanistan&lt;br&gt;• Donated and airlifted arms and ammunition to Afghan National Army</td>
<td>• Sent three Liaison officers sent to CENTCOM&lt;br&gt;• Feb 5, 2003: Joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm&lt;br&gt;• The National Assembly approved the Government of Bulgaria’s decision to support possible coalition action&lt;br&gt;• U.S. using Burgas Air Base to base transport aircraft and move troops, cargo, fuel and vehicles from Germany&lt;br&gt;• The joint the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq</td>
<td>• Overflight and transit of U.S. and coalition forces&lt;br&gt;• Deployment of Bulgarian NBC units (up to 150 personnel) to theater of operations; possible deployment of other specific units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>• Contributes, for six months out of every 11, a company of some 100 personnel to SFOR; an Estonian company just deployed and will be there until July 2003. (Similar deployment previously in SFOR)&lt;br&gt;• Maintains a Military Police Platoon of 23 personnel with the Italian Multinational Support Unit in SFOR&lt;br&gt;• Staff officer in SFOR MNB HQ&lt;br&gt;• CDEC officer in SFOR HQ</td>
<td>• Deployed two explosive detection dog teams of the Interior Ministry in July 2002 to assist with airport security; offered overflight and landing rights&lt;br&gt;• Deployed a 6-man EOD team with the German contingent of ISAF in March 2003</td>
<td>• Liaison officer sent to CENTCOM&lt;br&gt;• Feb 5, 2003: Joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm&lt;br&gt;• Overflight and transit of U.S. and coalition forces&lt;br&gt;• The Government is ready to consider concrete U.S. proposals for Estonian force contribution in the event of military action in Iraq; exploring the operational readiness of a light point defense platoon, EOD team, and cargo handling team for post-conflict Iraq if requested</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Political and Military Contributions by NATO Invitee Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Contributions in the Balkans</th>
<th>Contributions to the War in Afghanistan (ISAF and OEF)</th>
<th>Contributions made to the Coalition to Disarm Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom</th>
<th>Potential contributions Post-Conflict and Reconstruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Latvia** | - Contributes, for six months out of every 18, a company of some 100 personnel to Danish forces assigned to KFOR. (Similar deployment previously in SFOR)  
- Maintains military policy and medical team, 13 personnel in all, with the UK contingent in KFOR.  
- Maintains an EOD team of 5 personnel with the Norwegian Contingent in KFOR.  
- Until May 2002, rep involved with border observation in FYROM.  
- In 1999 Latvia deployed a medical team in Albania as part of the Deljan contingent in AFOR.  
- In 1999, sent 6 observers to the Kosovo Verification Mission. | - Offered overflight and port clearances  
- Offered combat and special forces for OEF  
- Deploying two medical teams totaling 8 personnel with the Dutch contingent in ISAF in March 2005. | - Liaison officer sent to CENTCOM  
- Feb 5, 2003, joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm  
- Overflight and transit of U.S. and coalition forces  
- Joined the coalition for the immediate disarming of Iraq  
- Parliament approved allowing forces to deploy to Iraq for peace enforcement and humanitarian operations | - Possible contributions under consideration: Latvian infantry company, military police platoon, medical unit, EOD, cargo handlers, and specific purpose units as well as contributions in support of democratic change in post-conflict Iraq. |
| **Lithuania** | - Contributes, for six months out of every 18, a company of 100 personnel with the Danish contingent to SFOR. (Similar deployment previously in SFOR and KFOR, will maintain a few officers in SFOR.)  
- Maintains an infantry platoon of 50 personnel with Polish battalion in KFOR.  
- Maintains AN-26 transport aircraft with crew and logistics personnel of 7 in support of NATO.  
- Contributed 10 medical personnel to NATO humanitarian mission “Allied Harbor” in Afghanistan in 1999. | - Offered use of Lithuanian airspace and airfields and other support for Operation Enduring Freedom  
- Deployed a Medical Team of 4 personnel with the Czech contingent in ISAF Oct - Dec 2002  
- Redeploying this team with the German Contingent in ISAF in Mar 2003.  
- Deployed Special Operations Forces unit of 37 personnel to Afghanistan in support of OEF in November 2002. | - Liaison officer sent to CENTCOM  
- Feb 5, 2003, joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm  
- Overflight and transit of U.S. and coalition forces  
- Joined the coalition for the immediate disarming of Iraq  
- Parliament voted March 25, 2003 to deploy cargo handlers and medical personnel to support Operation Iraqi Freedom | - Government has declared preparations to contribute politically and with other means to the efforts to the coalition for the immediate disarming of Iraq, e.g., 10 cargo handlers, 6 medics, also considering humanitarian aid. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributions in the Balkans</th>
<th>Contributions to the War in Afghanistan (ISAF and OEF)</th>
<th>Contributions made to the Coalition to Disarm Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom</th>
<th>Potential contributions Post-Conflict and Reconstruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Romania</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributed 132 personnel to SFOR, in Bosnia</td>
<td>Contributed a 411-man infantry battalion in Kandahar</td>
<td>Liaison officer sent to CENTCOM Feb 5, 2003: Joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm</td>
<td>Willing to provide post-conflict peacekeepers and guardsmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributed 222 personnel to KFOR</td>
<td>Sent a 25 man military police platoon in support of ISAF in Kabul</td>
<td>Provided an NBC Unit</td>
<td>Overflight and transit of U.S. and coalition forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributed personnel to all regional OSCE missions (total of 38 people)</td>
<td>Deployed a C-130 Hercules aircraft, including crew and maintenance personnel, to ISAF HQ in Kabul</td>
<td>Providing basing for U.S. forces at Mihai Kogălniceanu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployed 115 thousand and 70 civilian police to UNMBR</td>
<td>Overflight, landing and refueling rights were granted</td>
<td>Joined the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributed 18 civilian police to UNMBR</td>
<td>First country to donate and airlift 40 tons of ammunition to Afghan National Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosts the SECI center in Bucharest for combating transnational crime</td>
<td>Provided humanitarian aid totaling $3.2 million</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slovakia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provided troops to KFOR and SFOR (These troops have been integrated into the Czech units)</td>
<td>Offered NBC defense and engineering forces</td>
<td>Liaison officer sent to CENTCOM Feb 5, 2003: Joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm</td>
<td>Overflight and transit of U.S. and coalition forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per US and NATO suggestion, increased commitment to KFOR in February 2002, from 40 man Engineer unit to 106 man Mech Infantry Company (as part of Czech-Slovak battalion)</td>
<td>Sent 60 personnel engineering unit to Kabul. Extended stay of troops, at U.S. request, until August 2003</td>
<td>Deployed a 75 person NBC unit on February 26. The unit will be integrated into the Czech unit</td>
<td>Offered public support for all US-led initiatives in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased SFOR contribution in August 2001, from 4 staff officers to 21 personnel and two MI-17 helicopters under Dutch Command</td>
<td>Immediately granted overflight, landing and refueling rights</td>
<td>Agreed to be an Intermediate Staging Base for commercial charter carrying US troops and materials to and from CENTCOM AOR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granted bilateral overflight clearances at the outset of the Kosovo crisis</td>
<td>Has maintained two Liaison Officers at CENTCOM</td>
<td>Approved all requested rail and road transit rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Budgeted for and trained preparation of Afghan Assistance Program</td>
<td>Joined the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I hope that you might, when you have a chance, take a look at the charts. Because, if you look at those charts, the bar that these allies are on, we'll see on this chart—and again, I have given you one so you do not have to do an eye test—all seven already spend a higher percentage of their GDP on defense than almost a third of current NATO members. I think this is a telling chart. Although all of them have not made the 2 percent level, all seven also spend a higher percentage of their GDP on defense than almost a third of current NATO members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Contributions in the Balkans</th>
<th>Contributions to the War in Afghanistan (ISAF and OEF)</th>
<th>Contributions made to the Coalition to Disarm Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom</th>
<th>Potential contributions Post-Conflict and Reconstruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contributed troops and equipment to SFOR, and KFOR</td>
<td>Provided humanitarian and demining assistance, the latter also in conjunction with UNDP, a $10 million program</td>
<td>Sent Liaison officer to CENTCOM</td>
<td>Sent Liaison officer to CENTCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roni International Trust Fund for Demining (RTF) which managed over $100 million in successful demining and victims' assistance programs</td>
<td>Has sent one liaison officer (who will rotate in March) to OEF (CENTCOM, Fla)</td>
<td>Feb. 5, 2003: Jointed the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm</td>
<td>Provided assistance in the form of equipment and training to ISAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sentinci arsenal company to SFOR, replacing NATO troops in January, 2003</td>
<td>Slovenia has donated three battle tanks worth of AK-47’s, rocket propelled grenade launchers, mortars and the appropriate ammunition to the Afghan National Army Training Project</td>
<td>Asked its Parliament to approve overflight clearance, and intelligence sharing in support of UNSC resolutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Allowed NATO overhead for boosting missions against Serbia and allowed NATO troops to enter through port of Koper</td>
<td>Overflight, landing and refueling rights were granted</td>
<td>Willing to prepare specific humanitarian aid packages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Active in democratic and economic reform in the region, member of Stability Pact and SECI</td>
<td>Government decided (March 6, 2003) to send a police officer to the EU HQ “Allied Harmony” in Skopje</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I hope that you might, when you have a chance, take a look at the charts. Because, if you look at those charts, the bar that these allies are on, we'll see on this chart—and again, I have given you one so you do not have to do an eye test—all seven already spend a higher percentage of their GDP on defense than almost a third of current NATO members.
tion or in comparison to current allies. Their publics strongly support NATO. On March 23, Slovenians went to the polls to support NATO membership. The “yes” vote was 66 percent. In Romania and Bulgaria and the three Baltic States, support for NATO membership stands at over 70 percent. Together these allies will bring to the alliance almost 200,000 new troops, which is about the same number as the first enlargement.

What of future enlargements? This is a conversation we have had in this committee and privately in your offices. I believe that the door to NATO should remain open. In that speech he gave which put us on the path to this second expansion at Warsaw University in 2001, President Bush said that, “All of Europe’s democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the same chance for security and freedom and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe as Europe’s other democracies have.”

So we welcome the continued pursuit of membership by Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, and we will continue to consult with them and work with them on their membership action plan programs as well as others who may seek membership in the alliance.

Mr. Chairman, the third area that we discussed last February was the agreement between NATO and Russia to establish the NATO-Russia Council. I reported to you at that time that work was ongoing, and that work was completed in time for a summit meeting between NATO and Russia in Rome last May. Over the past 6 months, NATO and Russia have been working on projects in key areas, such as combating terrorism, peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, and nonproliferation. I believe this is also a part of the future of NATO.

We are also engaged in developing partnership with Ukraine. Unfortunately, this relationship has faltered due to the authentication of a recording that showed that President Kuchma had authorized the transfer to Iraq of the Kolchuga radar system. But because we recognize that Ukraine is so important, there is a NATO-Ukraine action plan which calls upon the Ukrainians to make political, military, and economic reforms if they wish to get closer to the alliance. Of course we have that broad web of connections through the Partnership for Peace with our Central Asian partners. I go back to thinking that, how would we have known that a decade ago we would need those partners to pursue Operation Enduring Freedom?

Finally, Iraq. We are at war with Iraq. Is there a role for NATO? Last December, Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, presented in Brussels ideas for possible NATO participation in Iraq. In addition to the defense of Turkey, he suggested that NATO play a role in post-conflict peacekeeping and possibly in stabilization. This could include the security and destruction of weapons of mass destruction. As I told NATO ambassadors at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council last month, for me these ideas still remain on the table.

As Senator Levin said, and you all have seen in the press and in the reporting, in February the alliance did go through a bruising debate about defense support for Turkey under article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The important point for me is that in the
end the alliance arrived at the outcome that we sought and the Defense Planning Committee directed military assistance to Turkey to address the threat of an attack from Iraq and that military assistance, as Senator Levin said, is now in place. NATO deployed AWACS, Patriot missiles, nuclear, biological, and chemical defense teams.

That debate in February did damage the alliance and I do not think we should say anything other than the truth here. It is my view, though, and I use a quotation from Lord Robertson, who said that this was a hit above the water line for NATO and that NATO will recover. As Senator Levin said, it will take good faith and good diplomacy on behalf of all of us to have that recovery take place as quickly as possible.

But I believe that NATO will recover because it is essential that NATO continues to knit together the community of European and North American democracies as an alliance of shared values and collective security. I think it would be wrong to draw the conclusion from last February that we should stop pushing NATO to change to address new threats. If anything, I believe we should redouble these efforts.

I also think that it would be wrong to conclude that the transatlantic relationship has been destroyed or even permanently harmed. At the end of the day, it is to NATO that we will all return to seek common ground and cooperation on the momentous issues facing the transatlantic community.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Grossman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MARC GROSSMAN

Senator Warner, Senator Levin, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. As always, it is an honor for me to be here.

I came before this committee 11 months ago and outlined a vision for the future of NATO.

Thanks to the strong support we received from you, Allied heads of state and government, meeting in Prague in November 2002, adopted this vision and launched an historic transformation of the Alliance.

Speaking to students in Prague on the eve of that Summit, President Bush promised that the Alliance would “make the most significant reforms in NATO since 1949—reforms which will allow the Alliance to effectively confront new dangers.”

Let me answer the question in your letter of invitation, Mr. Chairman and Senator Levin, about NATO’s continuing importance to U.S. security.

For 50 years NATO has been the anchor of western security.

The end of Soviet Communism did not diminish NATO’s importance.

- The democracies of NATO made and keep the peace in the Balkans.
- In 1999, NATO stopped ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
- NATO’s just-completed mission in Macedonia has also brought order to that new democracy.

NATO responded to September 11 by invoking Article V; an attack on one member will be regarded as an attack on all. NATO sent AWACS to patrol U.S. airspace, logging 4,300 hours; 360 sorties, with 800 crewmembers from 13 nations.

Thirteen Allies now contribute to Operation Enduring Freedom.

NATO Allies lead the International Stabilization force in Kabul.

German and Dutch troops replaced Turkish troops in ISAF, who replaced British forces. Lord Robertson and some of our Allies would like to see NATO take a larger role in ISAF. This makes sense to me.

NATO is the central organizing agent for Trans-Atlantic cooperation. It represents a community of common values and shared commitments to democracy, free markets and the rule of law.

NATO is key to the defense of the United States.

So NATO must continue to lead and to adapt.
NEW CAPABILITIES

Last year, we talked about the gap in military capabilities between the United States and Europe as the most serious long-term problem facing NATO. At the Prague Summit in November, NATO’s leaders decided to close this gap. The Prague Capabilities Commitment contains the ideas I presented to you last year. European Allies agreed to “spend smarter,” pool their resources and pursue specialization. For example:

—Germany is leading a 10-nation consortium on airlift.
—Seven nations are participating in another consortium on sealift.
—The Netherlands is taking the lead on precision-guided missiles and has committed $84 million to equip their F–16s with smart bombs.

This is a good start. Follow-through will be critical.

NATO’s leaders also created at Prague the NATO Response Force. We need NATO forces equipped with new capabilities and organized into highly ready land, air and sea forces able to carry out missions anywhere in the world.

NATO can and, in appropriate circumstances, should undertake military operations outside its traditional area of operations. The NATO Response Force will be a force of approximately 25,000 troops, with land, sea, and air capability, deployable worldwide on 30 days notice. NATO leaders agreed that the NATO Response Force should be ready for exercises by October 2004 and mission-ready by October 2006.

NATO also needs to streamline its command structure. When Allied Defense Ministers meet in June they will consider a leaner and more responsive, more modern command structure.

NEW MEMBERS

We also spoke last year of our determination to extend NATO membership to the new emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.

At the Prague Summit, NATO leaders invited seven new democracies—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—to join NATO. This invitation followed an intensive program of preparation under NATO’s Membership Action Plan. The Alliance worked with the aspirants to encourage political, economic and military reform.

Since Prague, the seven invitees have been working with NATO on preparing the accession protocols for joining the Alliance. In Brussels yesterday, NATO Ambassadors signed the protocols to begin the formal process of admitting the invitees into the Alliance. We will transmit the protocols to the Senate for its advice and consent. We hope you will support them.

The accession of these seven countries to NATO will directly benefit U.S. interests. These are strong Atlanticists. They are Allies in the War on Terror. They have contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom and to the International Security and Stabilization Force in Kabul.

(REFERENCE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION CHARTS)

At Burgas, Bulgaria provides basing for U.S. transport aircraft supplying Operation Enduring Freedom. Bulgaria also sent an Nuclear Biological and Chemical decontamination unit to Afghanistan. Estonia sent a team of explosive experts to Afghanistan. Lithuania deployed special operations forces to Afghanistan last year, and this year provided a team of medical personnel. Romania has an infantry battalion serving in Kandahar and military police unit and transport aircraft serving Kabul. Slovakia deployed an engineering unit to Kabul. Slovenia has provided assistance with demining in Afghanistan. They support the position of the United States on Iraq.

All of the invitees have committed to spending at least 2 percent GDP on defense, and as you can see, all seven already spend a higher percentage of their GDP than almost a third of the current NATO membership.

(REFERENCE DEFENSE SPENDING CHART)

Their publics strongly support NATO. On March 23, Slovenians went to the polls to support NATO membership. The “Yes” vote won with 66 percent. In Romania, Bulgaria and the three Baltic states, support for NATO stands at above 70 percent.
Together the invitees will also contribute as many as 200,000 new troops to the Alliance—approximately equal to the number added by NATO’s last enlargement in 1999.

What of future enlargements? The door to NATO should remain open. In his speech at Warsaw University in 2001, the President stated that, “all of Europe’s democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea all that lie between should have the same chance for security and freedom and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe—as Europe’s old democracies have”.

We welcome the continuing pursuit of membership by Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia. We will continue to consult closely with these nations on their Membership Action Plan programs as well as with others who may seek membership in the future.

NEW RELATIONSHIPS

During my appearance here last February, I noted the agreement between NATO and Russia to establish the NATO-Russia Council.

Work on establishing the Council went on through the spring and culminated last May in a summit meeting in Rome attended by President Bush, President Putin and NATO heads of state and government to formally establish the NATO-Russia Council.

Over the past 6 months, NATO and Russia have been working on projects in key areas such as combating terrorism, peacekeeping, civil emergency planning and non-proliferation.

NATO is also engaged in developing a parallel partnership with Ukraine. Unfortunately, this relationship has faltered due to the authentication of a recording in which President Kuchma authorized the transfer to Iraq of the Kolchuga system.

NATO also continues to develop a broad web of partners throughout Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. When NATO inaugurated Partnership for Peace nearly a decade ago, we could not have imagined that we would one day rely on our Central Asian partners to help defeat an enemy of the Alliance.

IRAQ

Today we are at war in Iraq. Is there a role for NATO?

Last December, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz presented in Brussels ideas for possible NATO participation in Iraq. In addition to the defense of Turkey, he suggested that NATO play a role in post-conflict peacekeeping and stabilization. This could include WMD security and destruction. As I told NATO Ambassadors last month, these ideas are still on the table.

In February, the Alliance went through a bruising debate about defense support for Turkey under Article IV of the NATO Treaty.

The most important point is that the Alliance arrived at the outcome we sought. The Defense Policy Committee directed military assistance to Turkey to address a threat of attack from Iraq. That military assistance is now in place: NATO deployed AWACs planes, Patriot missiles, and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical defense teams.

This disagreement did damage the Alliance. It is my view, however, as Secretary General Robertson himself said afterwards, that this was a hit above the waterline and that NATO would recover.

It is essential that NATO continues to knit together the community of European and North American democracies as an Alliance of shared values and collective security.

It would be wrong to draw the conclusion that we should stop pushing NATO to change to address these new threats. If anything, we need to redouble those efforts. It would be wrong to conclude that the trans-Atlantic relationship has been destroyed or even permanently harmed.

At the end of the day, it is to NATO that we will all return to seek common ground and cooperation on the momentous issues facing the trans-Atlantic community.

Chairman WARNER [presiding]. Thank you very much, Ambassador Grossman. I apologize for my tardiness, but we each morning conduct our briefings with the various departments and agencies, basically Defense and State, on the Iraq situation. So I was detained.

Secretary Feith.
STATEMENT OF HON. DOUGLAS J. FEITH, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Secretary Feith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too would like to start by mentioning Senator Moynihan's passing. He was an exemplary Senator and he was an erudite voice for the United States in the world, and he will be missed.

I would also like to thank the committee for the support that you give to the Defense Department and in particular to the men and women of our Armed Forces. It is important, it is much appreciated, and it is a great contribution to the country.

Chairman Warner. We thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your thoughts.

Secretary Feith. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to ask that my written statement be put in the record.

Chairman Warner. Without objection, both statements in their entirety will be in the record.

Secretary Feith. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I thank you for the opportunity to meet with you this morning to discuss the future of NATO. The alliance has had to rethink its nature and role over the last dozen years or so, impelled most forcefully by the end of the Cold War and then by the start of the global war on terrorism. The West's victory in the Cold War, though largely to NATO's credit, caused many people to question whether NATO had a continuing reason for being. The global war on terrorism I believe has rather clearly answered the question in the affirmative, the details having just been provided by Ambassador Grossman.

The strategic essence of the war on terrorism is the danger to open societies posed by terrorist networks and their state sponsors around the globe. That danger is especially grave in light of the chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons ambitions of leading state sponsors of terrorism. To counter that danger, the United States and our allies need an ability to manage multiple contingencies simultaneously in widely separated areas of the world.

Success in dissuading, deterring, and defeating our enemies in the war on terrorism requires strategies, capabilities, and command structures that allow for flexibility and quick action. We need a set of diverse tools for the job. As for the military tools, we need rapidly-usable, long-range, and lethal strike capabilities in response to good intelligence about unexpected events.

In the war on terrorism, it is useful for the United States to have allies, and NATO has contributed valuably to the war effort. The September 11, 2001, attack on the United States resolved a debate within NATO as to whether regions beyond the North Atlantic arena are out of area. NATO member states now realize that responding to threats emanating from beyond Europe is part of NATO's mission. The alliance recently decided to support Germany and The Netherlands, for example, in their leadership in Afghanistan of the International Security Assistance Force, a mission that brings NATO well out of its traditional geographic domain.

Mr. Chairman, I consider the term “international community” a loose term, because the world’s nations do not, alas, adhere in common to key philosophical principles. But NATO is accurately referred to as the Atlantic Community. The European and North At-
Atlantic allies do in fact share a commitment to democracy and individual liberty. Furthermore, our economies are thoroughly intertwined. In bad times, the United States has stood with Europe and, as demonstrated in the aftermath of September 11, Europe has stood with the United States.

We have our intra-community disagreements, as I will discuss further in my testimony, but the degree of harmony in the policies and interests of the NATO allies is rare among multinational organizations.

The North Atlantic Treaty serves as a foundation for transatlantic military cooperation. Ambassador Grossman has reviewed examples of such cooperation in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, and elsewhere and I will not go over this ground again. There is alliance-wide value in the forward presence in Europe of U.S. military forces. The bases that the United States uses in Europe have often facilitated the projection of American military forces to theaters of operation around the world. Our forward presence allows us to develop among American and European soldiers and units the interoperability and familiarity necessary for combined military operations.

As you all know, we are now working to enlarge the alliance. Senator Levin referred to yesterday’s event, the signing of the accession protocols in Brussels by the new NATO aspirants, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Our support for their integration into NATO is matched by their enthusiasm to contribute to our common security.

These seven countries have already been acting de facto as allies through participation in NATO’s Balkans missions, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the Kabul peacekeeping force. Marc Grossman mentioned their support for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Several have deployed troops to the Iraq theater. When they join the alliance, these seven will strengthen transatlantic ties. They will bring with them their fresh appreciation of the value of freedom.

If NATO is to fulfill its security tasks, it must be able to deploy forces with global reach that are agile, lethal, and technologically superior to any challengers. For this purpose, NATO leaders at the Prague summit last November launched a program to reform NATO’s command and force structures.

A key element of the program is the allies’ commitment to establish the NATO Response Force. If implemented to the standards proposed by the United States, the Response Force will be able to deploy with advanced notice measured in days, not months. Its elements will be able to execute the entire spectrum of combat operations. As Marc mentioned, our goal is for the force to be fully operational by October 2006. We expect the force to become a catalyst for NATO transformation efforts.

At Prague, the heads of state and government also approved an outline for a streamlined NATO command structure. Operational commands will be reduced in number from 23 to 16. This will make more efficient use of financial and manpower resources and, more importantly, NATO commanders will have headquarters that are more mobile, joint, and interoperable. The establishment of a new functional command, the Allied Command Transformation in Nor-
folk, Virginia, will provide a new engine to promote military transformation across the entire alliance.

Now for a few words about problems facing the alliance. NATO's first challenge is for allies to remedy their military shortcomings. NATO will not be able to perform its military missions if it does not fix longstanding shortfalls in such areas as strategic lift, communications, nuclear, biological, and chemical defense equipment, and precision-guided munitions.

Allies promised to redress these shortcomings through the Prague Capabilities Commitment, but NATO suffers from a long history of unfulfilled force goals. Continued failure in this regard will jeopardize the NATO Response Force. Allied contributions to NATO Response Force rotations must provide the capabilities envisioned at Prague if the force is to evolve from a paper concept to a fighting force.

A second important challenge, as alluded to in Senator Levin's remarks, is NATO's consensus rule. Will NATO be able to achieve consensus in the future, given policy differences among the allies and the increase in the number of allies? The dangers to allies posed by the nexus of terrorism, state sponsors of terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction may not emerge from Europe or even from Europe's periphery, but from distant parts of the globe.

In the future it is unlikely that NATO will face threats over which all 19 or 26 members would have to go to war all together. As demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq, unanimity or consensus for action within NATO will not necessarily be the norm. Some members of this committee, when we met last year to discuss NATO, suggested that it may be time to modify NATO's decision-making rules. The recent Iraq-related disagreements within the alliance, in which France and Germany put themselves at odds with virtually every other ally regarding the defense of Turkey, have brought the question to the fore.

I would like to make two points to launch our discussion here of this issue. First, the consensus rule has proven valuable in certain important ways. It has been a means to force nations to make decisions and it has tended to create pressure for unified positions rather than encourage divisiveness and obstructionism.

Second, the absence of consensus does not and should not stop NATO members from acting militarily outside of NATO as their own interests may require. When NATO members so act, they can benefit from the alliance by cooperating with allies, whose military capabilities are available or usable because of the interoperability, combined training, combined doctrine, and the like that is attributable to alliance activities.

Now, as to the recent problem of France's regrettable conduct within NATO, French efforts to block steps to enhance Turkey's security against possible Iraqi chemical, biological, or other attacks reflected a deliberate decision to block initiatives important to the alliance. It raised questions not only about NATO's decision-making, but its ability to make good on its obligation to member states.

Fortunately, the majority of current allies value NATO for the links it provides between Europe and North America. NATO enlargement and EU enlargement promise to reinforce in those insti-
tutions the ranks of those seeking close partnership with the United States. On issues of transatlantic concern, divisions appear more frequently within Europe than across the Atlantic.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to close with a comment on the future of the U.S. force presence in Europe. When President Bush asked Mr. Rumsfeld to serve as Secretary of Defense, he asked him to review our defense posture around the world. The Defense Department's 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review called for reconfiguring the U.S.'s global military posture in light of changes in the international security environment. We have been examining our posture and presence across the globe. This work aims to ensure that our military forces are appropriately structured, equipped, and deployed. We are rethinking our so-called “footprint” to take account of our key strategic concepts, for example the need for strategic and operational flexibility, the unpredictability of future challenges, and the low probability that our forces will be used in the immediate vicinity of where they are based.

We are thinking long term. Our decisions about where we want to base, exercise, and stage our forces are not being driven by transient considerations of current events. Our approach is to establish a presence appropriate to each region. We aim to diversify access, develop more adaptable expeditionary forces, promote greater allied contributions, and strengthen command structures to support our national security strategy.

We recognize the sensitivity of any changes to U.S. force posture and will consult with Congress, allies, NATO, and partners. In all events, Mr. Chairman, we expect that NATO will play a key role in the U.S. national security policy for the foreseeable future.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Feith follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. DOUGLAS J. FEITH

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The Alliance has had to rethink its nature and role over the last dozen years or so, impelled most forcefully, first, by the end of the Cold War and then by the start of the global war on terrorism.

The West's victory in the Cold War, though largely to the credit of NATO, caused many people to question whether NATO had a continuing reason for being. The global war on terrorism, I believe, has rather clearly answered the question in the affirmative.

The strategic essence of the war on terrorism is the danger to open societies posed by terrorist networks and their state sponsors around the globe. That danger is especially grave in light of the chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons ambitions of leading state sponsors of terrorism.

To counter that danger, the United States and our allies need an ability to manage multiple contingencies simultaneously in widely separated areas of the world. Success in dissuading, deterring and defeating our enemies in the war on terrorism requires strategies, capabilities and command structures that allow for flexibility and quick action. We need a set of diverse tools for the job. As for the military tools, we need rapidly usable, long-range and lethal strike capabilities in response to good intelligence about unexpected events. In the war on terrorism, it is useful for the United States to have allies. NATO has contributed valuably to the war effort.

The September 11, 2001 attack on the United States resolved a debate within NATO as to whether regions beyond the North Atlantic arena are “out-of-area.” NATO member states now realize that responding to threats emanating from beyond Europe are part of NATO’s mission. The Alliance recently decided to support Germany and the Netherlands, for example, in their leadership in Afghanistan of the International Security Assistance Force—a mission that brings NATO well out of its traditional geographic domain.
I consider “international community” a loose term because the world’s nations do not, alas, adhere in common to key philosophical principles. But NATO is accurately referred to as the Atlantic Community. The European and North American allies do, in fact, share a commitment to democracy and individual liberty. Furthermore, our economies are thoroughly intertwined. In bad times, the United States has stood with Europe. As demonstrated in the aftermath of September 11, Europe has stood with the United States. We have our intra-community disagreements, as I’ll discuss further in my testimony, but the degree of harmony in the policies and interests of the NATO allies is rare among multinational organizations.

The North Atlantic Treaty serves as a foundation for transatlantic military cooperation. Among its members, NATO promotes common defense policies, common military doctrine and integrated force postures. NATO’s success in military integration is found no where else in the world.

Over the last decade, NATO military forces brought peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Under the NATO flag, European forces have helped Macedonia overcome ethnic conflict. In Afghanistan, 50 years of NATO joint planning, joint training, joint staffing and joint operations enabled allies and partners to help oust the Taliban regime and give freedom to the Afghan people swiftly and efficiently.

There is alliance-wide value in the forward presence in Europe of U.S. military forces. The bases that the United States uses in Europe have often facilitated the projection of American military forces to theaters of operation around the world. Our forward presence allows us to develop among American and European soldiers the unpredictable and lethal threats confronting the Atlantic community.

NATO Enlargement: NATO accession protocols have just been signed in Brussels for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Our support for their integration into NATO is matched by their enthusiasm to contribute to our common security. These seven countries have already been acting de facto as Allies through participation in NATO’s Balkans missions, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the Kabul peacekeeping force. Six have publicly declared themselves Coalition members in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Several have deployed troops to the Iraq theater. When they join the Alliance, these seven will strengthen transatlantic ties. They will bring with them their fresh appreciation of the value of freedom.

If NATO is to fulfill its security tasks, it must (as I have noted) be able to deploy forces with global reach that are agile, lethal and technologically superior to any challengers. For this purpose, NATO leaders at the Prague Summit last November launched a program to reform NATO’s command and force structures.

NATO Response Force: A key element of this reform program is the Allies’ commitment to establish the NATO Response Force. If implemented to the standards proposed by the United States, the NATO Response Force will be able to deploy with advance notice measured in days, not months. Its elements will be able to execute the entire spectrum of combat operations. Our goal is for the force to be fully operational by October 2006. We expect the force to become a catalyst for NATO transformation efforts.

Command Structure Reform: At Prague, Heads of State and Government also approved an outline for a streamlined NATO command structure. Operational commands will be reduced in number from 23 to 16. This will make more efficient use of financial and manpower resources. More importantly, NATO commanders will have headquarters that are more mobile, joint, and interoperable. The establishment of a new functional command, Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia, will provide a new engine to promote military transformation across the entire Alliance.

Now for a few words about problems facing the Alliance:

Capability Shortfalls: NATO’s first challenge is for Allies to remedy their military shortcomings. NATO will not be able to perform its military missions if it does not fix longstanding shortfalls in such areas as strategic lift, communications, nuclear, biological and chemical defense equipment, and precision-guided munitions. Allies promised to redress these shortcomings through the Prague Capabilities Commitment, but NATO suffers from a long history of unfulfilled force goals. Continued failure in this regard will jeopardize the NATO Response Force. Allied contributions to NATO Response Force rotations must provide the capabilities envisioned at Prague if the NRF is to evolve from a paper concept to a fighting force.

21st Century Consensus: A second important challenge is NATO’s consensus rule. Will NATO be able to achieve consensus in the future, given policy differences among the allies and the increase in the number of allies? The dangers to allies posed by the nexus of terrorism, state sponsors of terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction may not emerge from Europe or even from Europe’s periphery, but from distant parts of the globe. In the future, it is unlikely that NATO will face threats over which all 19 or 26 members would have to go to war all together. As demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq, unanimity or consensus for action within NATO will not necessarily be the norm.

Some members of this committee, when we discussed this issue last year, suggested that it may be time for NATO to modify its decision-making rules. Recent Iraq-related disagreements within the Alliance in which France and Germany put themselves at odds with virtually every other ally regarding the defense of Turkey have brought this question to the fore.

I wish to make two points to launch our discussion here of this issue. First, the consensus rule has proven valuable in certain important ways. It has been a means to force nations to make decisions. It has tended to create pressure for unified positions, rather than encourage divisiveness and obstructionism.

Second, the absence of consensus does not (and should not) stop NATO members from acting militarily outside of NATO as their own interests may require. When NATO members so act, they can benefit from the Alliance by cooperating with allies whose military capabilities are available or usable because of the interoperability, combined training, combined doctrine and the like attributable to Alliance activities.

The Role of France: Now, as to the recent problem of France’s regrettable conduct within NATO. French efforts to block steps to enhance Turkey’s security against possible chemical, biological or other attacks by Saddam Hussein reflected a deliberate decision to block initiatives important to the Alliance. It raised questions not only about NATO’s decision-making, but its ability to make good on its obligations to member states.

Fortunately, the majority of current Allies value NATO for the links it provides between Europe and North America. NATO enlargement and EU enlargement promise to reinforce in those institutions the ranks of those seeking close partnership with the United States. On issues of transatlantic concern, divisions appear more frequently within Europe than across the Atlantic.

U.S. Force Presence in Europe: Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to close with a comment on the future of the U.S. force presence in Europe.

When the President asked Mr. Rumsfeld to serve as Secretary of Defense, he asked him to review our defense posture around the world. DOD’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review called for reconfiguring the U.S. global military posture in light of changes in the international security environment.

We have been examining our posture and presence across the globe. This work is ongoing and aims to ensure that our military forces are appropriately structured, equipped, and deployed. We are rethinking our so-called footprint to take account of our key strategic concepts—for example, the need for strategic and operational flexibility, the unpredictability of future challenges, and the low probability that our forces will be used in the immediate vicinity of where they are based. We are thinking long-term. Our decisions about where we want to base, exercise and stage our forces are not being driven by transient considerations of current events.

Our approach is to establish a presence appropriate to each region and increase capabilities to act promptly and globally in response to crises. To do so, we aim to diversify access; develop more adaptable, expeditionary forces; promote greater Allied contributions; and strengthen command structures to support our national security strategy. Any changes will be designed to increase our flexibility and forward access. We recognize the sensitivity of any changes to U.S. force posture and will consult with Congress, Allies, NATO, and partners.

In all events, we expect that NATO will play a key role in U.S. national security policy for the foreseeable future.

Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. That is a very good statement. We will now proceed with a 6-minute round among those members present.

A question of niche capability. I have been somewhat of a skeptic about the continuous enlargement of NATO through the years. This time I have tried to pay my respect to the President’s decision and the decision of others and go forward, and it looks like it will be ratified eventually by the Senate.

But part of the reason why I feel I want to support it this time was this doctrine of niche capability. That is explained to me that a nation, some of these smaller nations, cannot be expected to have
the 360 degree—I think that is the word that was used as a description—military force, air, sea, land, so forth. Some of them do not require any sea component, but they could have certainly the air and land. Given their somewhat tenuous financial ability within their own economies to get the money to quickly start up that force that would be expected, they are relying on a niche capability. Namely, they have specialized training and have been recognized for that capability.

Could someone expand on that? I think that to me is a very persuasive reason to support this package.

Secretary FİTH. Mr. Chairman, we see right now in Operation Iraqi Freedom the value that some of our allies bring by contributing what you could refer to as niche capabilities—chemical and biological weapons decontamination capabilities, for example. In some cases there are allies that have lift capabilities that they can contribute, and in some cases intelligence. In particular, there are countries that have human intelligence capabilities that are a real contribution, a real augmentation of our own.

There are a number of areas where countries that do not have the full range of capabilities in their armed forces can nevertheless be important contributors, including in peacekeeping, including in providing services for the stability operations phase of wars. We see—and we saw it in Afghanistan and we are seeing it now in Iraq—this could be an important part, an important role that NATO will play in the future, working together to be able to do operations in a way that really does distribute the burdens. It does not require the entire set of allies to go to war together, but the ability of the United States to integrate the contributions, these niche, so-called, contributions, into our own operational plans has everything to do with the fact that we are allies, we work together, we train together, we have common doctrine, we have interoperable equipment.

So the alliance can play a valuable role and the expanded alliance can really increase the capabilities of the different allies to operate in coalitions, and I think this is going to be an important part of the future of NATO.

Chairman WARNER. You said we are trying to fix our shortfalls. Supposing one or more of these nations simply does not want to develop a heavily equipped land force and NATO says to them: All right, you go into the airlift business. Take your funds and just specifically get a very strong airlift.

In other words, is targeting being done as the nations are brought in to tell them, do not worry about bringing several heavy motorized, mechanized regiments, just concentrate on airlift? Is that specifically done? I saw you, Ambassador Grossman, nodding your head.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. It is, Senator. I think, as you say, one of the great reasons to support this round of expansion, as it was the last time, is precisely because they bring these capabilities to the alliance. In my statement, in my written statement which you were nice enough to put into the record, there are a series of examples about how this works with all seven of the members. As you say, we have capabilities that come to us in the nuclear, biological, chemical area.
Estonia, for example, very specialized naval forces which are rapidly deployable; Bulgaria, very important NBC capabilities. Romania, interestingly enough, when they deployed to Afghanistan, they airlifted themselves, which a lot of NATO members would not be able to do. So there are these capabilities and, as you say, I think it is a very important reason to support this expansion.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.

You talk about how we are rethinking the missions and so forth of NATO. You touched on the very important last round or the round before where we had the out-of-area decision, which was a major one. You gave the benefits of the consensus rule. Is any thinking under way now to possibly modify that rule, or is it just static for the moment?

Secretary FEITH. I think there is a lot of thinking going on in light of the recent difficulties that we have had over policy differences within the alliance.

Chairman WARNER. Let me just give you an example. People go to sleep at night thinking that their local police force is there to protect them during the night and when they wake up in the morning. I think a lot of people look upon NATO as that great protectorate that is there, and all of a sudden a problem occurs and then there is a debate down there and they are static, they are not moving, they are immobilized, and the problem worsens. There comes a point in time, well, how do we deal with the problem? Who is going to come to help us?

Now, NATO could be putting a false sense of security into its immediate area and perhaps, it goes beyond its borders, and that false sense of security might work to the strong detriment in a situation that is developing more rapidly than the Turkish situation. So it seems to me you have to do some thinking about having NATO be able to reach a decision faster and get around a situation where one nation could absolutely block its reaction to a crisis.

Secretary FEITH. Mr. Chairman, what you are saying, I believe, is clearly correct. This does require careful thought. There are two interesting aspects of the NATO debate on protecting Turkey when Turkey invoked article 4. One aspect is the dispatch by The Netherlands of Patriot batteries to Turkey on a bilateral basis, which is an important model. It is an important tool that is available to NATO countries. There was a bilateral arrangement, facilitated undoubtedly by the fact that these countries are allies, but a bilateral arrangement was made so that NATO did not have the ability to completely block——

Chairman WARNER. My time is up. I accept that as an ad hoc——

Secretary FEITH. Then the second point, if I may, is that the decision that was blocked when it was discussed at the North Atlantic Council was then moved into the Defense Planning Committee (DPC)——

Chairman WARNER. I understand, which circumvented the North Atlantic Council.

Secretary FEITH.—which meets at 18, and by excluding the French we were able to achieve a consensus in the DPC to help the Turks.
Chairman WARNER. But the next time there may be a hot fire fight and people are actually losing their lives while this process is trying to unfold on an ad hoc basis.

Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. I have been concerned about that issue, as you both know, for a long time and never really gotten a satisfactory answer as to whether or not indeed, as you just put it, Secretary Feith, there is a lot of thinking going on. You said it needs careful thought. I do not see that it is getting any careful thought in NATO.

The idea that now there will be 26 countries, each one of which could veto an action by NATO, is creating a greater likelihood that someday there will be a veto exercised that cannot be overcome by referring something to the planning committee from the council. Is NATO taking this issue up? I do not see it. I do not see this on any agenda at NATO.

Ambassador Grossman.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I would say the answer to your question is no, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Should it not? Should it not be on an agenda there if indeed Secretary Feith is correct that this needs a lot of careful thought? He says a lot of thinking is going on. Is it going on at NATO? I do not see it.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I do not think it is going on in any systematic way. I hope that people who are here in the audience and people in NATO who are listening to this hearing will take what you and Senator Warner and others have said seriously, and that this kind of conversation needs to go on.

I also think that people who are listening to this hearing ought to recognize that this is one of the disadvantages of the kind of terrible activity that went on in February, it opens these kinds of questions.

Senator LEVIN. I think it ought to go on in a systematic way, and I think we ought to put this on an agenda. I would ask that you let this committee know—and I think obviously the chairman is the only one who can direct you to do this.

Chairman WARNER. I so direct.

Senator LEVIN. So with the chairman’s permission, that you let this committee know whether we are going to put this issue at NATO for consideration.

The same thing is true with the inability to remove or suspend a member of NATO who no longer complies with the fundamental tenets of NATO, commitments to democracy, open markets, and so forth. Some day there is a likelihood that some country is going to become anti-democratic. Just statistically, history has indicated that can happen. What will happen? That country could have a veto over any action of NATO and there is no way to remove a country or suspend a country. That item ought to be discussed, too, not in the context of these seven countries—that is not the issue—in the context of there being now 26 countries, that the greater statistical likelihood—the more countries are in NATO, the greater the likelihood that that can happen.

Also give us an answer as to whether that issue will be brought up to NATO for discussion? Let this committee know as well?
Ambassador GROSSMAN. I will do so.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

The European Council, meeting at the level of heads of state or government, adopted a number of conclusions at the end of its meeting on March 21. As regards Iraq, this is what their conclusion was: “We believe the U.N. must continue to play a central role during and after the current crisis. The U.N. system has the unique capacity and practical experience in coordinating assistance in post-conflict states. The Security Council should give the United Nations a strong mandate for this mission.”

But yesterday’s Washington Post reported that the Pentagon’s civilian—here I am quoting, “The Pentagon’s civilian leadership has prepared a post-war plan for a short-term military occupation followed by an indefinite U.S.-run civil administration that would determine the form and pace of an eventual resumption of Iraqi control.”

Then that report went on to say that, “The State Department counters that turning Iraq over at an early stage to a U.N. administration which would supervise a gradual turnover to Iraqis as it did in Afghanistan would be more palatable to Iraqis themselves and that such a plan also would garner far more international financial and political support and begin the process of rebuilding multilateral cooperation that was shattered during the bitter U.N. debate over the war.”

Now, to what extent, I would like to know from each of you, is there accuracy here? It would appear that the State Department agrees more with the European Council and that the Pentagon disagrees. You are laughing, Ambassador Grossman. Why are you laughing?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I am laughing because I have never been accused of agreeing with the European Council before and I do not think that is a position I want to be in.

Senator LEVIN. This says the State Department. It is not personal. It is not personal to you.

Is there a difference between the State Department and the Defense Department on that issue?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I do not think so, sir. Let me make an answer and we will see if there is a difference. First, we take our guidance from the statement that was issued in the Azores by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair and the President of Portugal, which is to say that we do believe that the United Nations has a role to play in the future of Iraq. I think that is absolutely clear. It says we plan to work in close partnership with the international institutions, including the U.N., our allies, and partners. We plan to seek the adoption on an urgent basis of a U.N. Security Council resolution that would affirm Iraq’s territorial integrity, ensure rapid delivery of humanitarian relief, and endorse an appropriate post-conflict administration for Iraq. That is what we take as our guidance.

I think, as Secretary Powell has said on a number of occasions, that there is a role for the United Nations to play. But I think both Doug and I would agree that, now that our forces are engaged in combat, we recognize our responsibilities that we have taken on here for humanitarian issues, for political issues, and for recon-
struction issues. We would like them to be a part of that. But I take my guidance from the President.

Senator LEVIN. Secretary Feith, basically do you agree with that, because the time is short.

Secretary FEITH. I do agree with that. The kinds of things that the U.N. I think could very helpfully contribute in a post-war period in Iraq would be assistance regarding refugees, humanitarian aid, the World Food Program. There may be a role for the IAEA in helping with the dismantlement of the weapons of mass destruction. I would imagine that the U.N. will be appointing a special coordinator of some kind.

I think there are a number of roles that the U.N. could play that would be most welcome in post-conflict Iraq.

Senator LEVIN. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Allard.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a personal concern that France, which has a propensity for restricting trade, will try and use its trade to influence decision-making among its allies that it trades with as it affects votes in the United Nations or perhaps even how it might impact NATO policy. We saw some of that surface here, I think, when France brought up the issue of support from the newer applicants into NATO, saying that if they supported the United States with Iraq that they would oppose their membership in NATO.

So the question that I have is have you seen any indication that France has sought to punish those countries that support our position on Iraq, either through membership in NATO or through some kind of trade policy?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Senator Allard, I do not believe that I have seen anything specific on the economic side, or the trade side. But if you would allow me to give you an answer for the record on that. I do not think so, but I would like to check.

[The information referred to follows:]

After the “V–10 statement” by the NATO aspirants expressing support for the U.S. position on Iraq, President Chirac stated the V–10 countries had “missed a good opportunity to be quiet” and chastised them for not coordinating their position with the other EU members first. President Chirac was widely criticized for these remarks in America and in Europe.

President Chirac has spoken out about his belief that EU aspirants need to abide by the EU’s common positions on issues, but we have yet to see evidence of specific actions to punish the invitees that supported U.S. policy on Iraq.

On the political side, yes, sir, absolutely. I think that the statements that French leaders have made, first against some of those countries that signed an article 98 agreement with us on the International Criminal Court, then signed the Statement of Eight supporting our position on Iraq, the ten who supported our position on Iraq—we have been very clear that that is not the kind of pressure that ought to be put on sovereign countries who have a right to decide what their foreign policy is. We will continue as strongly as possible to support them, certainly in NATO where we have a voice and a vote, but we also believe that they are very important potential members of the European Union as well.

Senator ALLARD. Some believe France is pushing other European nations to unify under the banner of the European Union, frankly,
just to oppose U.S. power. It appears that France desires to act as a counterweight to the United States. Do you believe that France is trying to check U.S. power and, if so, what are the implications for the NATO alliance?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Obviously you would have to ask a representative of France why they do what they do. I think that if you take the specific case that Doug and I both referred to in February, of Turkey calling for an Article 4 agreement or Article 4 consultations with the alliance, the disagreements there I think were damaging to the alliance, as I testified in my statement.

Senator ALLARD. But let me repeat my question here for you. Do you believe France is trying to check U.S. power?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Again, I think you have to ask them why they do what they do.

Senator ALLARD. But what is the State Department's belief on this? How do we feel towards France's actions in the State Department?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. We feel that the current disagreement between France and the United States, and I would say between France, Germany, and the United States, on the question of Iraq is very damaging and is out in the open for everybody to see.

But I would also say, Senator, that, while we have a fundamental disagreement with them over Iraq, we fundamentally agree with them on many other things. We are working with them in Afghanistan to train the Afghanistan national army, as Senator Levin talked about before. We are in the same camp regarding the expansion of NATO. We are working together in Operation Enduring Freedom.

So if you say to me, give me one answer, one headline about this relationship with France, with all due respect, sir, it is more complicated than that. Secretary Powell, I thought, got off quite a good line the other day. He said, France and the United States have essentially been in marriage counseling for 225 years. I do not mean to be jovial about that, but we are still married and we are still here and they are still part of the alliance and, as the President said at his news conference the other day, they are still a friend of the United States.

So do we have a fundamental disagreement about Iraq? Yes, sir. But do we have this alliance with France? Yes, we do.

Senator ALLARD. Let me come at it in another direction. I think it is obvious that France is trying to be competitive with the United States on trade. I do not think there is any secret there that they are trying to be a competitor as far as the United States is concerned. So why would we not expect them to be applying that in their negotiations on a political basis?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I think, Senator Allard, when I give you a full answer to this question we will find that over the years—this is before Iraq—the European Union has tried to change the terms of trade with the people it is inviting into the European Union to the disadvantage of the United States.

Senator ALLARD. So why would we not expect them to bring that same effort into public policy as we talk about public policy issues within NATO or within the United Nations?
Ambassador Grossman. Sir, I think they absolutely have brought them. This is why I say what President Chirac said about the 10 countries that signed the V–10 statement, what President Chirac said about Romania, these are things that we regret and it seems to me is exactly the kind of political pressure that should not be brought by one country on another.

Senator Allard. We are talking about a power struggle then, are we not, between the United States and France?

Ambassador Grossman. Again, you would have to ask them what their vision is. But I think the vision of some people in Europe, which I think is a wrong vision, is that the European Union is somehow some great competitor with the United States. I see this in the opposite way. I think that if the European Union and the United States would work together on some of these big challenges around the world, not just political but economic as well, that we would accomplish a lot.

I think it is too bad that there are people in the European Union who believe that the only way to go forward is in a competitive way.

Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.

Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Dayton.

Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I commend you for those remarks, Mr. Secretary, and I hope those will be the spirit of the administration moving forward. Winston Churchill once said, to conclude the quote, “In victory magnanimity, in peace goodwill.” It seems to me that if we take those in anticipation of victory and move ahead, we set the lead and we set the tone of these, and I hope we can—as you said, if we agreed on everything all the time we would not need treaties or alliances. I commend you for that.

In terms of admitting the new countries, is there a way to use those countries and their relationships with other neighbors, such as Ukraine, to intensify the effort to secure nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union or nuclear weapons materials? Is that something, does this provide an opportunity to do so?

Ambassador Grossman. I believe it does, Senator. The Ukraine I think has—I believe I am right—given up all of its nuclear weapons, and very commendably so. But the question of nuclear material is an extremely important one.

May I say, Senator, just to your first point, we do set the tone here and so I do appreciate what you say, that NATO is not the Politburo and the European Union is not the Politburo and we are dealing here with democracies, and that is a very important part of our strength. As I said to Senator Allard, we disagree on some things, but we so profoundly agree on so many things that we will go forward in that spirit, I am quite sure.

Senator Dayton. I am not well-versed in the particulars of these countries and Ukraine, as you pointed out, in terms of nuclear weapons and materials. But to the extent that they have those, can this be one of the conditions or expectations for membership, that they are going to really batten down the hatch, ideally relinquish those materials?
Ambassador GROSSMAN. Yes, sir. I am sorry, I apologize. Of the seven that are coming in, yes, absolutely, they should not be in this business at all. Other people, others have made the good suggestion that this adds to our possibility also of taking a look at civilian nuclear reactors, for example, in these countries and bringing them up to certain safety standards.

Senator DAYTON. Mr. Secretary?

Secretary FEITH. Senator, the NATO Partnership for Peace program in which these various countries participate, and there are a number of other countries that are still in that program, has addressed seriously the question that you are raising of controlling dangerous materials, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction-related materials and technologies from the former Soviet Union. There has been work together on controlling exports, border control, and the like as part of the program for the Partnership for Peace, and I think that it has been useful.

We have invested in it and we have been quite pleased with the results.

Senator DAYTON. Good. Thank you.

Russia once viewed the admission of these seven countries as a mortal threat to its own security. How has that been resolved? Has it been resolved?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I think it has been resolved. When I testified here 11 months ago I said, who could believe that we would be sitting here at that time looking at the possible inclusion of these seven members, and particularly, Senator, the three Baltic States, and essentially have the Russians—I do not say they have to love this, but not being opposed to it.

I think there are three reasons for that. First is I think the Founding Act, which was the agreement that we made at the first expansion in these past few years, worked tolerably well. It was not perfect, but it worked tolerably well.

Second, I believe September 11 changed people's calculation. You will remember President Putin went to Brussels in October 2001 and said, "who NATO brings into NATO is NATO's business." That is a big breakthrough and I believe that he recognized the change in strategy.

Third, as I reported in my testimony, I believe that this new NATO-Russia council is also beginning to show some benefit. As I promised here a year ago, it is not a back door to NATO for Russia and it is not a way for Russia to veto what NATO wants to do. But if we can work on air space management and civil emergency planning, getting ready for emergencies, those are all good things, sir.

So I believe that the whole change in strategy here, and the way people are thinking about their strategy, has been much to our benefit.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you.

In terms of the force presence in some of these 20th century outposts around the world, given the call-up on the Reserves and the National Guard, at least in Minnesota, we have had any number of very patriotic men and women who are now in their second tour of duty in less than a year. At the same time, some of the active forces are not—"dormant" was the word I was going to use. That is probably not the right characterization, but they do not seem to
be as actively engaged in support of the current war effort as the Reserves and National Guard who have been called up.

Are we really going to bite the bullet on this and not in a way that is perceived as retaliation or reaction to some of these disagreements, but really in a way that from a cost-effectiveness standpoint that we are trying to take back what we do not need to be present? Given these kind of deployments, as you said all over the world, from anywhere in the world, it just does not seem to make sense so much to have these kind of numbers of troops and the costs of them distributed around the world.

Secretary Feith. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, Senator, we are reviewing our force posture globally and we are looking to ensure that we have the kind of forward presence that contributes to our capability to react quickly to events. We need flexibility. We have taken forces from different parts of the world and moved them around, and that is an important part of the flexibility that we need.

I think the kinds of concerns that you have raised are part of our thinking. We want to make sure that we have the right forces deployed in the right places with the right kinds of flexibility so that we can use what we need where we need it. There is a major difference between our thinking now and our thinking during the Cold War, and that is, in the Cold War, the key concept behind our deployments in Europe was that the forces were going to be used in Europe. We had a focus on where the threat was coming from and it was the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. We had an idea of what the battlefield was, and we had our forces there in the battlefield ready to go.

What we have learned since the end of the Cold War is that we have no idea where the next battlefield is going to be. Secretary Rumsfeld stresses all the time that when Dick Cheney was being questioned by the Senate in his confirmation hearings nobody asked any questions back in 1989 about Iraq, and when Secretary Rumsfeld was being questioned this time for his confirmation hearings nobody asked any questions about Afghanistan. This is not a reflection on the Senate. He did not think of it either. Nobody thought that we were going to be fighting in the next place where we wound up fighting.

What that means to us is we need to have our forces deployed appropriately around the world, but not with the notion that they are going to be fighting where they happen to be based. That is a very important element of our analysis in thinking through our global force posture.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.
Senator Collins.
Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Feith, I want to follow up on the discussion that you began with Senator Dayton about the deployment of our forces. I believe that it is time for us to take a hard look at our base structure in Europe. For example, we have more than 70,000 military personnel stationed in Germany, and that obviously makes sense
in the context of the Cold War, but, as you have just pointed out, today's strategic environment is very different.

As the boundaries of the alliance continue to move eastward, might it be advisable to consider shifting some of our base structure and the deployment of some of our troops to the territory of some of the newer members of NATO, and is that under consideration at the Department of Defense?

Secretary FEITH. Senator, the short answer is yes, in that we are trying to think in a completely unconstrained way about what our military footprint should look like in the coming decades. The ideas that we have been developing on this subject are that there is value in forward deployment, and we have a thought that there could be a number of places in the world, hubs, as we are referring to them, where we could have a substantial presence, a large base.

But there are a number of other places around the world where we might want to create forward operating bases or what we refer to as forward operating locations, where our footprint would be a lot lighter. But, by having certain relationships in place, certain rights established in advance, a certain amount of infrastructure, and maybe some personnel, we would have the capability to deploy rapidly into certain areas.

We are not looking at this issue from the point of view of creating so-called permanent bases. We always think that the word "permanent" should always be in quotes because various places where we have had permanent bases we no longer have bases and so nothing is quite permanent. But even large-scale bases with a large, sustained presence of U.S. personnel, there may be a few places where you want that, but in many other places around the world you do not want that. What you want is, as I said, maybe a small number of U.S. forces and some infrastructure to allow us to bring forces in, arrangements so that we rotate forces through in regular exercises.

We are giving a lot of thought to this issue of how to get postured correctly so that we have the right kind of forward presence, but we are not tying ourselves down, as Senator Dayton was referring to. That is an important consideration, and also the idea of taking advantage of the expansion of the alliance to develop the kinds of relationship and presence with the new allies. That is an important part of our thinking.

Senator COLLINS. If we bring the total number, Ambassador Grossman, of nations up to 26 countries, does not that further complicate the command and control and operational difficulties, make it more difficult also to achieve consensus in NATO? Perhaps Secretary Feith should also comment on this question.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I do not think so, Senator Collins. I mean, are there more people, is it more complicated? Of course, it would be evident that it is more complicated because there are more people. But I believe that if you bring in seven more members on top of the three that you brought in a couple of years ago with the Senate's advice and consent, who are committed to this alliance and, as Doug said, to the community of values that we have, and that they have these niche capabilities that Senator Warner referred to, and that, for goodness sakes, of all of them they are al-
ready prepared to spend seriously on defense, I think, whatever challenges there are, we can work our way through them.

I want people around that table who are prepared to act and who are prepared to do something. If you look at the history of the last enlargement, where we brought in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, what happened to them 2 weeks after they signed up? They were in battle in Kosovo. So, as we have said in our testimony, these seven allies already act as allies.

So I think this is actually a plus for the alliance because it brings in people who want to be there and it brings in people who want to act.

Senator Collins. Secretary Feith, let me ask you something else instead of asking you to comment on that question. That is, you said in your testimony that the most serious or one of the most serious problems facing NATO is the inequitable sharing of the burdens of NATO, with the United States offering by far the largest commitment of resources, whether you are talking financial, equipment, or troops.

We have heard for many years the debate over the need for the European nations to step up their investment in their military and their contributions to NATO, and you have cited the most recent commitments. I do not mean to sound skeptical or cynical, but what makes you think this time it is going to be any different?

Secretary Feith. I think your skepticism is well-grounded. There is a lot of history, which I referred to in my opening remarks, of our being disappointed with unfulfilled promises regarding the development of capabilities.

I think that the point that the chairman highlighted is in part an answer to why we think that there may be some way of mitigating this problem. If we can get allies that are not trying to pursue the full range of military capabilities focused on those areas where they can make a real contribution and become important partners for future coalitions, we can make sure that they have, if not the full range of capabilities, at least a set of capabilities that allows them to participate proudly and enthusiastically in the common effort.

We are looking to that as a way ahead to try to address this issue. Once upon a time when we talked about the capabilities gap, I think a lot of people had in mind this idea that people were going to try to develop a full range of capabilities. It is clear that nobody was going to have the full range of capabilities that could compare to that of the United States and there was always going to be an enormous capabilities gap if you looked at it from the point of view of the total capability of one of the other allies' forces versus those of the United States.

But if you think about it from the point of view of special operations forces with certain capabilities or airlift or intelligence capabilities in certain areas, there is no reason that a proper investment by a number of these allies could not get them up to top level, comparable level with us, in important areas, and also high end areas. I want to make the point that some people have suggested that this idea of niche capabilities means that the United States does the important or more glamorous work of military operations
and then we ask the allies to come in and do the peacekeeping or the less important work, as some people have described it.

I want to make it clear, that is not our concept whatsoever. We are delighted if our allies have high end capabilities, have combat capabilities, have the ability to participate with us in whatever area they want to concentrate their effort in.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you.

Senator Bill Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. In light of that, will we consider moving some of our U.S. bases from Western to Eastern Europe?

Secretary FEITH. We are thinking through the question of where our bases should be in Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East, around the world. So, at this point I would not rule anything in or out. This is a matter that is ongoing right now. Every short while we are getting together with Secretary Rumsfeld and reviewing concepts for revisions in our global posture. So that it is certainly an idea that is on the table.

Senator BILL NELSON. Let me ask you something about Turkey. There is good news and there is bad news. As of this morning, the good news is that Turkey has not moved into northern Iraq, so that we do not have that compounding problem with the Kurds. But the bad news is that they did not let us come over land through Turkey so that we could get a division into northern Iraq and therefore as we move on Baghdad we are limited in our ability coming from the north, which means that the Republican Guards in their movement do not have to worry so much about the north and can concentrate on the south.

That is not a help to the United States, what Turkey has done. I would like your comments.

Secretary FEITH. Senator, you are correct that Turkey’s failure to cooperate with us on the introduction of the Fourth Infantry Division into Iraq was a bad thing and it would have been a lot better had they cooperated with us. They have, however, given us an important type of cooperation in granting us overflight rights and we are making substantial use of those overflight rights, and that is a type of cooperation that we appreciate.

Senator BILL NELSON. Overflight rights, I might say, well after the war started.

Secretary FEITH. But we are using them now and they are valuable.

The problems that we had with Turkey—and I will let Marc Grossman comment; he used to be the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and he is highly knowledgeable on the subject. I would just say briefly, the problems that we had with Turkey were surprising and very disappointing. I would say especially so to people who have long believed that Turkey is an extremely important, and I continue to believe, ally of ours that has stood with us loyally, steadfastly, for decades.

Senator BILL NELSON. For half a century.

Secretary FEITH. In many circumstances, and it was very surprising and deeply disappointing that we had these problems in this case.

Senator BILL NELSON. Very much so.
Ambassador Grossman.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I would just add one or two sentences, Senator, if I could. One is, I think the points that you just made about the continuing importance of Turkey to the United States are something we ought to hold in our minds even while we are disappointed with what happened. Second, just to be clear—and I do not make this in any way an excuse—but I think it is important to recognize that the Government did go to the Parliament with our request on the 1st of March and was defeated in Parliament. So although perhaps they might have done a better job of vote counting and getting ready for the activity, what we asked them to do, which was go to your Parliament and seek approval for these things, that they did do.

But I do not disagree with anything that Doug has said.

Senator BILL NELSON. Among Turkish officials—I found myself having a debate one night on national TV with the Turkish ambassador to the United Nations, and his position was that we had been heavy-handed with them, we had been pushy, pushing our weight around.

How did it get to this with an ally of such many years longstanding?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Senator, first, I think we have to take into account public opinion in Turkey. I think we have to be honest about this. Every public opinion poll taken in Turkey for the last 6 or 7 months has shown that over 90 percent of people in Turkey oppose U.S. activity in Iraq, and Turkey is a democracy.

Senator BILL NELSON. That anti-U.S. feeling went up the more they felt like we were pushing our weight around.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I can only defend what we did, and what we did was respond to the very clear request of military commanders, exactly as you laid it out, that a northern option with Turkey would be better for the United States strategy if at that time we had to go to war with Iraq.

I think both Doug and I were in exactly the same position, and that is, when the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commander on the ground says, "I need this," our job was to go out and try to get it.

Senator BILL NELSON. You are a specialist on Turkey. You have been there as Ambassador. Was there a significant change as a result of the Turkish election?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Yes, sir, I think there were two important changes. First, is that you had a government—and I mean no disrespect to them—that got elected some time in November. I apologize, I cannot remember the date—and 2 or 3 days later Paul Wolfowitz and I traveled to Turkey and we said, "welcome to your new positions and, oh, by the way, here are all the things that we would like to do together in terms of getting ready for a possible war on Iraq." You can imagine the strain that that put on their system.

Second—again, they would have to speak for themselves. The other thing is that they had a big democratic Parliament to manage. When they went on the 1st of March, I believe, and I will tell you I believe, they went to win. They did not go there to lose. The fact that they lost maybe said something about the strength of the
opposition. It said maybe something about their newness in government.

Third, because of this very large number of people opposed to this war on Iraq, they had constituents, and they had to deal with all of those things. So I say, I am not a spokesman for Turkey. I just simply try to answer your question and give you my perspective.

Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Thank you.

Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Just to follow up in Turkey, when you say you were surprised and there was a failure of our diplomacy, I do not think how you could paint it any other way. Our expectations were far different and we did not get what we expected, and we are paying a heavy price for it now in the conflict.

Ambassador Grossman, given the trouble we had with the French in the North Atlantic Council on the question of Turkey’s defense and our ultimate ability to win the vote to reinforce their defenses only by having the vote in the Defense Policy Committee, is the administration considering proposals to alter the NATO decisionmaking process in order to prevent future French vetoes of routine alliance decisions? I want to emphasize, this was a routine alliance decision.

Ambassador Grossman. Senator, we want first of all to use the alliance structure that exists.

Senator McCain. I would like to know if you are considering proposals to alter the NATO decisionmaking process?

Ambassador Grossman. I committed to Senator Levin that that would be something we would enter into on the agenda of NATO, yes, sir.

Senator McCain. On the subject of France, a country can either be an ally or a counterweight. It cannot be both. Given France’s expressed strategic goal—and that is why I am a little bit confused by your response that Secretary Powell says we have been in counseling for 200 years. We have never seen anything like this before, that the French have displayed public statements of being a counterweight, public statements made by public officials in the French Government, not private conversations but public. I would be glad to supply you with the media reports in case you missed them, Ambassador Grossman.

Have we changed our view that a European Rapid Reaction Force separate from NATO, as the French have been pushing for so hard, does not threaten the role of the alliance and the transatlantic relationship?

Ambassador Grossman. Senator, two points. One is that I certainly think what has gone on in the past few weeks has been very difficult and terrible. But with all due respect, when you had a France in 1966 that actually kicked the Alliance out of Paris, which was a pretty substantial public disagreement across the Atlantic——

Senator McCain. I would be glad to debate history with you, but when they made a unilateral decision to kick NATO out of Paris that was a decision that Mr. deGaulle made. It had no real impact
on the infrastructure of NATO except that we had to move the headquarters.

But if anybody believes that our relations with France are not at the all-time worst, then they have not been making the same observations as most of the American public, including this citizen.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Fair enough.

On the second question, Senator, I will speak for myself here. No, sir, I have not changed my mind about the utility of having Europeans do more in their own defense. I have not changed my mind, sir, about the desirability of having a European force which is connected through various mechanisms and rules of the road to NATO. I think it would be an advantage to the United States if the Europeans would do more than talk about their own defense and actually deploy.

We are going to find out here, Senator, over the next few weeks because on the 31st of March the European Union is going to deploy to Macedonia, take over this mission for NATO. Again, you may disagree and, if so, I am glad to talk to you about it, but I think that is a plus, sir, not a minus.

Senator MCCAIN. Can you tell me a military action scenario that you could envision a European Rapid Reaction Force being involved in as a separate entity without the involvement of the United States of America?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Without the involvement of the United States of America through NATO, no, sir.

Senator McCAIN. Then what does the European Rapid Reaction Force do militarily?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I think it does exactly what it will do here in a couple of days——

Senator MCCAIN. I am asking, is there any military role that you could see, a military scenario, a scenario where they would be involved militarily? I am not talking of peacekeeping. I am talking about in a conflict.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. The answer to that question is no, sir, not yet, because the Europeans themselves have set for themselves what they call the Petersburg Tasks. At the moment I cannot remember all of them, but they have to do with peacekeeping and humanitarian follow-on. So they do not set themselves the goal in the headline of 60,000 troops deployable in 60 days, sustainable for a year, to do combat with those forces, no, sir.

Senator McCAIN. So they do not envision it as a combat role? It would be a peacekeeping role?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Peacekeeping, humanitarian. As I say, there are four or five Petersburg Tasks, which I would be glad to provide for the committee. I cannot dredge them up at the moment.

[The information referred to follows:]

As envisioned by the EU, the European Rapid Reaction Force should eventually have the capability to fulfill the full range of "Petersburg Tasks," including crisis management operations that may involve combat forces. The Petersburg Tasks, as agreed by EU members in their 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, include: humanitarian and rescue; peacekeeping; and crisis management, including peacemaking. The EU has committed itself to working in partnership with NATO through the NATO–EU "Berlin Plus" framework. Under "Berlin Plus," the EU would only consider crisis management military operations where it is clear that NATO as a whole will not be engaged.
Senator McCain. It is remarkable.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
I would like to follow on that line of questioning on my own time with just a quick one to fill in at this point. France is on the North Atlantic Council, but not in the integrated military structure. Does this one foot in NATO, one foot out, give them special privileges or ability, flexibility, or whatever word you might wish, to do the things that they have done?

Ambassador Grossman. Yes.
Chairman Warner. Well then, somebody ought to address that.
Ambassador Grossman. I was not doing a very good job with Senator McCain. I think one of the good things that happened, maybe among the small number of good things that happened in February, was I think it was very important for the alliance to move that decision from the NAC to the DPC. With respect, Senator, that was using the existing structure to deal with this problem.

So if you ask me, I think, as Senator McCain said, if I am faced with more routine business that is not getting done, I would use the DPC more, not less. But as I say, that is my opinion.

Chairman Warner. That was a lot of damage done in the time it elapsed.

Ambassador Grossman. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. We now go to our colleague Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry I was late. I was tied up in another meeting.

I know I have heard some discussion today about the changing mission of NATO, niche capabilities, the decisionmaking process within NATO. But let me ask the two witnesses, if I can, just to summarize: What is NATO's mission today? What is the actual mission of NATO?

Secretary Feith. It is to defend the interests of the members of the alliance.

Senator Pryor. Has it changed any since we have added the new members and since the Cold War is over?

Secretary Feith. Senator, I think that there has been for a long time a question about whether it is fair to describe NATO as simply a military defense organization or more broadly a security organization that takes into account more than just military defense, takes into account all the various concepts that go under the term "security," including political stability and the like.

I think it is fairly clear that NATO is a security organization. It has both the effect and the purpose of providing security, not simply in the sense that it helps protect the members from outside threats, but it also helps keep peace among the members. NATO I think can be credited not only with defending Europe from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact throughout the Cold War, but also helping to secure and foster the well-being of the members themselves in their own internal relations.

Senator Pryor. I agree.

Secretary Feith. I think that it continues to have that purpose.

Senator Pryor. It gives them a commonality of interests, because if you look at the member nations they have not always been
friends, and NATO has been some glue at least that helps hold them together.

Now let me ask this. In the post-September 11 era in which we now live, it seems to me that a natural role for NATO to play, especially given the goals of al Qaeda to be at war with the West and to fight against the West, is anti-terrorism, not just in Europe but really around the globe.

It seems to me that one thing that NATO could do—and I would like to hear your comments on this—is be very active in anti-terrorism activities, again not just in Europe but around the globe because, as we all know with September 11 here in this country, but there have been many instances of terrorism in Europe and around the region for years and years. Most Americans think that terrorism started on September 11, or at least that is the first real face-to-face contact we had with it, but we all know it has been a problem for a long time.

What is NATO’s role with regard to the global war on terrorism and what should it be?

Secretary Feith. The role that it has played so far has had a number of parts. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attack, NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time ever. It dispatched AWACS airplanes to the United States to help in the defense of the United States when we had our assets committed elsewhere.

Various NATO countries have helped us in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. Many NATO countries are helping us in Iraq. As I noted in my opening statement, even when that kind of help is not institutional, an institutional role for NATO as such, the fact that there is an alliance and the fact that we operate together and develop the capability to work together in military operations and train together and develop common doctrine and have the consultative mechanisms, all of that facilitates our working as coalition partners with our other allies even when NATO as an institution is not itself playing a role.

So I think that NATO has had an important place in our thinking about the war on terrorism. I think that it could have a greater role if the capabilities that it has pledged to develop are in fact achieved, and we are working on that and we are pushing for that. But I think that the attack on September 11, as I noted before, resolved once and for all the issue of whether NATO is exclusively focused on Europe or whether it has a defense mission out of area. It is clear that, given the terrorist threat, which is a threat to all open societies, including the Europeans, they understand that if they are going to be dealing in a relevant fashion with the main threats that face us they are going to have to be working with the United States globally.

Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.

Senator Ben Nelson.

Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Powell did refer to France and the United States as going through lengthy marriage counseling. I do not know if we are on our way to divorce, but legal separation may be just around the corner, the way it is heading.
I think we have learned recently that the difference between many of our friends and adversaries may be greater than we would want to believe. Sometimes it seems to be a matter of money, how much, the difference between a buyout and a buyoff. But I think we all understand that individual interests make it very difficult to have common interests.

I am not negative about NATO, but I am concerned about how we are able to merge interests into common thinking and common sharing, because if we are unable to do that then the alliance will not work for anyone. If it does not work for us, it does not work for anyone; if it does not work for somebody else, clearly it will not work for us.

I have two questions. One is about the niche military. In one sense I think it makes a great deal of logic. There is a great deal of logic to having many of the countries provide some of the niche services. But if you are a nation like the United States or Britain and you decide you have to go it alone, are you going to be short-handed when it comes to dealing as we are right now in Iraq if you are relying on another country to provide some of the military backup, part of the services, whether they are specialized, whether it is the medical or whatever it may be?

How do we get around making sure that we do not rely to our detriment on that, because if we were relying on France today or Germany or Russia, which is not a part, or China, which is not a part, but where would we be ultimately?

The second question, which is part of it, is there is, it seems to me, a growing tension between the EU and the United States in our relationship. I am concerned that the tension that could develop between the EU and NATO, whether it is about common trade or common defense, might merge, and can we ultimately expect to be the odd man out?

Secretary Feith. To start, Senator, and I will turn the question about the European Union over to Ambassador Grossman. But you made a remark about the United States needing to act alone, and I think——

Senator Ben Nelson. Or nearly alone.

Secretary Feith. I do not believe that we are even nearly alone. We have, I believe, well over——

Senator Ben Nelson. I am not trying to relate it to the current situation, but in the future the President said—and I think he is absolutely right—that we have reserved the right to defend the United States and to go it alone, if necessary. What I was suggesting is, if we make that decision at some point in the future, will we be disadvantaged by relying on a niche common military component?

Secretary Feith. I think that it is correct that the President has to take the position that if we needed to defend ourselves and we had to act alone we would act alone to defend ourselves. It has never been the case, though, recently that we have had to act alone in our own defense. We have always had friends and allies who have been willing to participate with us in one way or another.

I would note that in the current fight in Iraq we have nearly 60 countries that are contributing in one way or another to the coalition effort, providing either access, basing, overflight, or force pro-
tection, or other types of contributions, including combat forces. Of those nearly 60 countries, we have nearly 50, I believe 49 or so, that are now willing to associate themselves publicly with the coalition. So there is quite a broad coalition supporting our efforts in Iraq.

Your point about the niche capabilities, I do not think it is a problem. If we need to operate and we want to rely on some friends to contribute important capabilities—“niche” perhaps is not the best word because perhaps in some people’s mind it connotes something very narrow. What we are really talking about is not a few states with extremely narrow capabilities. We are talking about the recognition that not all states in the alliance are going to have the full range of capabilities.

Senator BEN NELSON. I agree with that. They cannot afford it, and the common defense ought to make it unnecessary for them to do that. But we are either faced with redundancy or dependency.

Secretary FEITTH. I do not think that is necessarily the case. We need to have whatever capabilities the U.S. Armed Forces need to be able to defend us under all circumstances, including if we had to operate alone. But it is always the case that if you have friends and allies that are ready to contribute to the effort it is helpful if they have capabilities that they can bring to the fight to be able to incorporate those capabilities.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. On the European Union, Senator, I think the scenario that you have laid out, if it came to the point where the European Union and the United States were on opposite sides of important issues in this world, it would be a disaster. I believe that the European Union and the United States, and Europe and the United States, and NATO and the United States are part of the same transatlantic whole.

As Senator Levin said in his introduction, it is going to take good diplomacy, good faith on both sides to make this go forward. That is why I in particular am so interested and such a big supporter of EU expansion.

Senator BEN NELSON. I do not disagree with that, but I do wonder if we are going to be able to export as much as we are able to import, or whether we are going to continue to encounter trade barriers under other names, such as genetically modified organisms (GMO) and the like.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I could not agree with you more. The whole argument over GMO food between the United States and the European Union has been a hopeless argument and when you think of some of the consequences, which is people in Zimbabwe do not get enough to eat, I think it is a terrible thing.

That said, we have to lift up our sights here. I know that Bob Zoellick is working with his counterparts in the European Union, and why is it not that the European Union and the United States are together going to the Doha Round at the World Trade Organization and make trade freer and better for all of us? These are trillion-dollar trading relationships.

So no disrespect to any place else in the world, but I still think that this transatlantic relationship is the platform on which the United States and Europe can do business inside of Europe and outside of Europe for the good of both of our populations.
Senator BEN NELSON. I agree with you. I also think that we have some friends who are better friends than other friends, and it is good to see a few of those here today, too.

Thank you.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Senator Nelson, that is why we would like so many of them to be in the European Union.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Clinton.

Senator CLINTON. I appreciate the last exchange very much because I share Ambassador Grossman's opinion about the importance of this alliance and the role that it will play in the future, not just what it has done in the past.

But I want to get back to the point that was made both by the chairman and the ranking member about the opportunity for some kind of process that leads to modernizing, reforming, whatever word we wish to use, with respect to the way NATO functions. How exactly are you going to pursue that?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Senator Clinton, first let me just say that before you came both Doug and I expressed our condolences on behalf of the State Department and the Defense Department for Senator Moynihan's passing, and I wanted to do that to you personally.

Senator CLINTON. Thank you.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I will have to consult with Ambassador Burns, I will have to consult with others in the administration, about what the best mechanism to do that is. Senator Levin and others raised this a year or so ago. We debated it. You remember at that time what we were concerned about was what if countries were not very democratic, how would we deal with them. Now we are concerned with countries who block——

Senator CLINTON. That are too democratic in our point of view, which is what we are hearing today, right.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Fair enough, but who block NATO's way forward. So I do not mean to avoid your question, but I do not want to get locked into a process today that is going to solve today's problem, which might not be next year's problem. So I committed to Senator Levin that we would take a look at this. I will commit to you that we will talk to Ambassador Burns and others, and we will meet our obligation to put this into the thinking of the alliance.

Chairman WARNER. If I could interject, that is a very important question that you raise, Senator. Senator Levin, and then I joined him, jointly have made a request for a formal communication back from the Department of State to this committee once that procedure has been reviewed and a decision made as to how or how not to implement it.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. That is a perfectly fair way to put it.

Senator CLINTON. I really appreciate that, because I am a very strong supporter of NATO and the Atlantic Alliance on which it rests. I am particularly pleased at the expansion that has been undertaken. I think it is an opportunity not only for us to meet in a new century the goals that Secretary Feith described to Senator Pryor, but to think anew about what additional opportunities and goals we should be pursuing.
So I cannot stress enough that this is essential in my view to saving the alliance in more than just name. That is not what we want.

Second, I think that the conversation that has gone on, particularly with respect to France and to a lesser extent Turkey, illustrates the contrary to what the implication might have been. In fact, I think it illustrates quite strongly the need for us to redouble our efforts to repair whatever damage has occurred within the NATO alliance and to redouble our efforts to build strong relationships.

I am particularly concerned about Turkey and I know Ambassador Grossman has a special interest, having hosted me there. I think I have visited every one of the NATO countries, both members-elect and others. With respect to Turkey, I think that it is important that our country not send a mixed message about democracy.

It was unfortunate, but I think that the ambassador's explanation about a new administration coming in, in a sense, one that had frankly been on the outside, one whose relationship with the Turkish military was at best an unknown, at worst perhaps not even that good—there was a lot of very important negotiation to be undertaken with our ally. I think it is especially important that we pursue it now with the new Government of Turkey. I also hope that we will redouble our efforts—and I know this administration has made a very concerted effort—on behalf of public diplomacy.

But if we are going to be a coalition of democracies, we cannot just expect the people in those countries to rubber stamp whatever their governments proceed to do despite what our assessment might be. So I just want to make sure that we are supporting the NATO alliance, we are supporting the Atlantic relationship, and we are looking for ways to strengthen it going forward.

Ambassador Grossman. May I just say, Senator, I appreciate all of those points. Just to say, as Senator Warner did, we will endeavor to send you back a report on what we do, but also to make the point that Senator Warner just did, that as we review this it might be, as Under Secretary Feith testified in his statement, that the consensus rule is something we would like to keep.

So I want to make sure that my commitment to you is to think about this, to make a proposition, to consult with Ambassador Burns. But I do not want to stand up here thinking that there is only one way to go here. It may be that we continue to believe in this consensus principle, which I strongly do.

Second, I think, Senator, that the question of using what has happened over the past few months at NATO as a reason to redouble our efforts to strengthen the alliance is exactly right. That is what I testified to in my opening statement, is that those people who are taking these events as a reason to walk away from this alliance I think have it exactly backwards.

Third, on Turkey—and I certainly remember very well what was a fantastic visit for us—we have said every single place that we have been asked about this, the first line when any Turkish journalist or anybody else asked us is, Turkey is a democracy. Turkey has a Parliament. Turkey's Government had to decide for itself when to go to its Parliament, how to go to its Parliament.
So we have been very clear about this that, although that vote did not go the way we wished and that is to which we have testified, that Turkey has a Parliament, Turkey has a democracy, and that is what Turkey decided.

Chairman WARNER. Senator, thank you very much for that line of questions.

We will now proceed to do a brief second round. I have taken the liberty to place before each of our witnesses a letter that I wrote the President of the United States a week or so ago. It is not unlike a letter that I wrote to him last August. Should any press person desire a copy, my staff or others have copies of it.

[The information referred to follows:]


President GEORGE W. BUSH,
The White House,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I would like to commend you on the step you took today to give new impetus to the Middle East peace process by announcing that it was time to share with Israel and the Palestinians the road map to peace that the United States has developed with its “Quartet” partners. This is a welcome and timely initiative, given the complex way in which the Middle East conflict, Iraq and the global war against terrorism are intertwined.

The festering hostilities in the Middle East are an enormous human tragedy. Along with you, and many others, I refuse to accept that this is a conflict without end. You have articulated a vision of an Israeli and a Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security. That is a bold initiative that deserves strong international support. With the Israeli elections concluded, and the imminent confirmation of a Palestinian Prime Minister, you are right to refocus international attention on the Middle East peace process.

Mr. President, in August 2002, I wrote to you to propose an idea concerning the possibility of offering NATO peacekeepers to help implement a cease-fire in the Middle East. I have spoken of this idea numerous times on the Senate floor. I am now even more convinced that the United States and its NATO partners should consider an additional element for the “road map” concept: NATO should offer, and I stress the word “offer,” to provide a peacekeeping force, once a cease-fire has been established by the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority. This NATO force would serve in support of the cease-fire mechanisms agreed to by Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The NATO offer would have to be willingly accepted by both governments, and it in no way should be viewed as a challenge to either side’s sovereignty. The acceptance of this offer would have to be coupled with a commitment by Israel and the Palestinian Authority to cooperate in every way possible to permit the peacekeeping mission to succeed.

I fully recognize that this would not be a risk-free operation for the participating NATO forces. But I nonetheless believe that the offer of peacekeepers from NATO would have many benefits. First, it would demonstrate a strong international commitment to peace in the Middle East. Second, it would offer the prospect of a peacekeeping force that is ready today. It is highly capable, rapidly deployable, and has a proven record of success in the Balkans. A NATO peacekeeping force is likely to be acceptable to both parties, given the traditional European sympathy for the Palestinian cause and the traditional United States support of Israel.

Third, this would be a worthy post-Cold War mission for NATO in a region where NATO member countries have legitimate national security interests. It could even be an area of possible collaboration with Russia through the NATO-Russia Council. A NATO peacekeeping mission in the Middle East would be wholly consistent with the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept. Approved at the NATO Summit in Washington in April 1999, the new Strategic Concept envisioned so-called “out-of-area” operations for NATO.

Given the fractious debate in NATO over Iraq and the defense of Turkey, it would be important to show that NATO can work together to make a positive contribution to solving one of the most challenging security issues of our day.

There will be many detractors to the idea of sending NATO peacekeepers to the Middle East to help implement a cease-fire. But I think there is broad agreement on the imperative of giving new hope to the peace process and redoubling diplomatic efforts to keep Israel and the Palestinians moving on the road to peace. Peace-
keepers coming from many NATO nations could give new hope and confidence to
the peoples of Israel and Palestine that there could soon be an end to the violence
that overhangs their daily lives.

Mr. President, I hope that you will receive this idea in the constructive spirit in
which it is offered.

With kind regards, I am

Respectfully,

JOHN WARNER,
Chairman.

This relates to the future of NATO, which is very much an issue
before this committee today, and that is Lord Robertson, and I
think to some extent Ambassador Burns, have indicated that they
are looking at other challenges that might be brought to NATO. I
can think of no more pressing challenge at this point in time than
the Middle East conflict between the people of Israel and the Pal-
estinian people. I am not in any way today trying to assign blame
or equate right or wrong. It is just a situation that has persisted
for a very long time.

I, just speaking for myself, do not see steps being taken in the
future that could help lessen that conflict. In my opinion, you can-
not initiate the all-important peace process, particularly reinvigo-
rate it, I should say, without a considerable lessening of this ten-
sion and killing on both sides. The citizens of these nations are the
ones that are suffering so greatly.

So I said very respectfully to the President, and I will just read
the first paragraph: “I would like to commend you”—and this was
written on March 14—“on the step you took today to give new im-
petus to the Middle East peace process by announcing that it was
time to share with Israel and the Palestinians the road map”—that
is the coined phrase that you utilize in government today—“to
peace that the United States has developed with its ‘quartet’ part-
ners. This is a welcome and timely initiative, given the complex
way in which the Middle East conflict, Iraq, and the global war
against terrorism are intertwined.”

Again, it is my view that the men and women of our Armed
Forces, coalition Armed Forces, indeed so many of the embassy peo-
ple worldwide, and many others are subject to terrorist attack,
which could in some instances be motivated by the continuum of
this conflict. I know that when I recently, with my distinguished
friend and colleague, visited the region, specifically Qatar and Ku-
wait, at every stop it was brought to our attention—I might include
Pakistan—by representatives of their government at the highest
level that this problem had to be addressed because it is affecting
so many decisions that they are trying to make in their country,
most of them in support of the coalition forces now operating at
great risk in Iraq.

So the idea, the concept that—I do not mean to be the sole au-
thor of this concept or idea; I think others have looked at it—is
simply that NATO has a proven record of peacekeeping capabilities
in the Balkans. It is ready to roll. Should peacekeepers be brought
in, they are the ones that most quickly can be implemented.

So how does one go about it? In no way do we want to impose
on the sovereign rights of the people of Israel or the people of Pal-
estine any decrement in their sovereignty. So it would have to be
at the invitation of both the Governments of Israel, and now with
the new prime minister having been designated, I presume that he would be the point of contact for such invitation among the Palestinian people. It would be my hope he would be.

Now, if NATO examined this as an option—and I have actually sat down with Lord Robertson and discussed it with him. I have actually brought this up with the NATO ministers when they were here in Washington some time ago, and they were here at the Senate and I rather boldly got up and, somewhat to their surprise, raised this. I have raised it in other fora and it seems to me there is interest and support for the concept.

But the principles are that NATO would have to indicate to the respective governments what they could do in return for certain guarantees from both governments as to what they could do by way of implementing a ceasefire, by way of NATO coordinating—I use that word—with their own security forces to maintain that ceasefire. So it is a partnership situation.

But it brings together NATO, to me, addressing a very serious crisis which is intertwined so much with other crises worldwide, namely that in Iraq, and it also—clearly, through history many of the European nations have had a long-time relationship with the Palestinian people. We in the United States are very proud of a long-time relationship with Israel. That relationship again has brought to our attention any number of times as we travel the world, those of us here in the Senate and others. Indeed, in briefings we have had recently in the context of the Iraq situation we have been told that the Governments of these various nations that are supporting us are watching very closely as to what we will do in conjunction with Great Britain and others to ameliorate this crisis.

But there we would be with the Europeans and the United States as partners in the peacekeeping role. Possibly some of our uniformed persons would be involved, but I presume a preponderance would be drawn from other nations. But again, it would show the United States working together with our NATO partners.

So that is just an idea to put on the table. It has been raised before by others, but I wish to share it with you this morning in the context of this very important and I think an excellent hearing, gentlemen, the testimony given by you and the responses to the questions.

Somebody just has to say, let us take a look at it and bring it up, as you do so frequently, quietly with the respective parties and see whether or not they have any interest and whether NATO would have any interest. I think this letter just asks for a reasonable exploration as to whether NATO would be willing to accept the challenge and whether the two countries principally involved would be willing to make their commitments and look upon this as a means to help the road map get started in the peace process for consideration.

So I lay that out. If either of you have any comment, I would welcome it here this morning.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Senator, I think we both will obviously take that letter seriously. I am appreciative that you would share a letter to the President from you with us. We will both commit to you that we will go back and consult with our respective Sec-
retaries and treat it absolutely seriously. I do not know how else to respond, but I very much appreciate your sharing this with us.

Chairman WARNER. I appreciate that.
Secretary Feith?
Secretary FEITH. Yes, we will be happy to take it back and discuss it.

Chairman WARNER. Fine. I thank you very much.

One further question on the role of missile defense cooperation in NATO. Secretary Feith, I know we are engaged in ongoing efforts with Italy and Germany to develop defenses against short and medium-range ballistic missiles and that the United Kingdom has agreed to support the improvement of the early warning radars. You know where they are to be located—steps that will improve our ability to defend against long-range missiles. We are not only providing for the defense of limited attack against this Nation, but indeed those of our principal allies.

Please summarize for us the status of U.S.-NATO cooperation in missile defense and how do you assess the willingness of NATO governments to participate in this effort? Is there a corresponding interest and willingness on the part of European aerospace and defense industries to engage with defense industries?

Secretary FEITH. Mr. Chairman, this is a subject of great importance to us and we, with your strong support, have been working on developing missile defenses for the United States and cooperation on missile defenses with our allies. The work on this subject which has been going on and is quite technical is being done by my colleague, Assistant Secretary J.D. Crouch, and what I would like to do to give you a meaningful answer would be to reply for the record and I could give you the details.

There are a lot of discussions within NATO and there are a lot of bilateral discussions that are under way on different aspects of this issue. I think it would be probably most useful if I replied for the record.

Chairman WARNER. Are you suggesting in your usual diplomatic way that you would like to take the question for the record?
Secretary FEITH. Yes.
Chairman WARNER. Both of you?
Ambassador GROSSMAN. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

Secretary FEITH. We have had useful discussions with our NATO allies on missile defense over the last year:

• In July 2002, the U.S. sent a team to NATO headquarters and 12 NATO capitals to consult with allies on our missile defense policy and program, explain how we are going to implement the President's decision that missile defense will defend allies and friends and deployed forces, and explore opportunities for international participation in U.S. missile defense efforts.
• At NATO's Prague Summit in November 2002, allied heads of state and government took a major step forward by endorsing a new missile defense “Feasibility Study” to examine options for protecting alliance territory, forces, and population centers against the full range of missile threats. The study is scheduled for completion in the winter of 2004.
• A previous theater missile defense feasibility study (recently completed) was limited to examining defenses for allied deployed forces against shorter-range ballistic missiles. This new feasibility study is an important step for NATO in that it recognizes the threat posed to alliance territory and population centers by longer-range ballistic missiles.
We have reached agreement to use the appropriate NATO body to coordinate alliance missile defense activities.

In addition to these discussions in NATO, the U.S. is pursuing opportunities for bilateral missile defense arrangements with NATO nations.

Ambassador Grossman. Developing missile defense systems, which will protect deployed forces and eventually populations and territories of allies, is a priority for NATO. NATO has recently concluded a feasibility study of theater missile defense options to protect deployed forces and will be proceeding with follow-up work to consider actual deployments of a layered theatre missile defense system. NATO heads of state and government at the Prague Summit in November 2002 also agreed to a new feasibility study to examine options for defense of allied populations and territories against all ranges of missiles. This NATO work will be consistent with our own evolutionary approach to developing missile defenses for the U.S. deployed forces and allies and friends that was decided by the President last December.

In addition to the ongoing work at NATO, we also have a number of bilateral missile defense projects ongoing with our NATO allies. Furthermore, NATO has initiated a project within the NATO Russia Council (NRC) to examine possible areas of cooperation between NATO and Russia in the realm of theater missile defense. The U.S. has taken a lead role in ensuring that this work, which has become an important cornerstone of NATO-Russia cooperation, has a solid conceptual foundation and takes advantage of our own bilateral theatre missile defense cooperation with the Russians.

Chairman Warner. That is fine and I will accept that.

Senator Levin.

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to pick up where I left off, on the article in The Washington Post that suggested there was a difference between the State Department and the Defense Department about whether the United Nations should at some point take over the civil administration of Iraq from the U.S. and then from there it would go to the Iraqis. The answer that I got was an answer to a different question. My question is not whether the U.N. would have a role in humanitarian assistance or some other role, my specific question related to The Washington Post report that the Pentagon civilian leadership has prepared a post-war plan where there is an indefinite U.S.-run civil administration. The State Department, on the other hand, proposes that Iraq be turned over at an early stage to a U.N. civil administration, which would then supervise a gradual turnover to Iraqis as it did in Afghanistan, and that would be more palatable to the Iraqis.

So that is what I want you to focus on: Is there a difference between the two agencies at this point on that specific issue?

Ambassador Grossman?

Ambassador Grossman. No, sir, I do not believe so.

Senator Levin. Secretary Feith.

Secretary Feith. I do not believe so. I think the idea that we have is that we want to put as much responsibility into the hands of Iraqis as soon as possible.

Senator Levin. Is there a role for a U.N. takeover of civil administration from the U.S. before that happens in your plan?

Secretary Feith. If things go well, we should be able to have the Iraqis running their own affairs soon and there would not be any requirement for a U.N.-run administration of Iraq.

Senator Levin. You are obviously planning on things going well, so you do not foresee a role in the takeover of the civil administration of Iraq by the U.N. prior to its being turned over?
Secretary Feith. Our hope is that there would not have to be any such debate because the Iraqis would be in a position to assume responsibility for their own affairs.

Senator Levin. Directly from a military administration?

Secretary Feith. Yes.

Ambassador Grossman. Yes, absolutely.

Senator Levin. Now, on your testimony that related, Ambassador Grossman, to Ukraine and NATO and that the relationship has faltered due to a radar transfer to Iraq by Ukraine. There are elections coming up in Ukraine and it is critically important, it seems to me, that those elections be democratically run and that all political parties ought to have unhindered participation in every facet of the electoral process, including membership to the central elections commission.

I am wondering whether or not the United States is going to be pressing for that and, if so, specifically how?

Ambassador Grossman. Yes, certainly we will press for the most free and transparent election in the Ukraine. We completed a very intensive review of our relations with Ukraine and we recognize how important it is, but how much difficulty President Kuchma in his person has made for this relationship. So we will use the tools that we have through the National Endowment of Democracy, through USAID, through our public diplomacy, as we do in many places around the world. We cannot ensure, but to try to encourage as transparent and democratic an election there as possible, as we would elsewhere in the world.

Senator Levin. Sure. But in terms of any future participation of Ukraine in NATO and as to whether they adhere to democratic values, that would be viewed, I take it, as one indicator of whether they adhere to it, whether they run truly democratic elections, including access to media?


Senator Levin. Now, on the NATO Response Force, which again I guess it was Ambassador Grossman who spoke of, you indicated that NATO leaders have agreed that this force should be ready for exercises by October 2004. I am wondering whether or not any benchmarks have been established for that force and whether or not any benchmarks have been reached in terms of moving toward those exercises.

Now, perhaps Secretary Feith is in a better position to answer, but either one of you could perhaps address that. It is about 5 months since that statement was made, I believe. Has anything happened in the last 5 months to move us toward exercises in October 2004 by a NATO Response Force?

Secretary Feith. Senator Levin, I will have to reply on the record to that. I just do not know off the top of my head.

[The information referred to follows:]

NATO heads of state and government at their Prague Summit last November agreed to create the NATO Response Force (NRF). If implemented to the standards proposed by the U.S., the NRF will be militarily effective (lethal), technically superior to any envisioned threat, and readily deployable on short notice. We also expect it to become the focal point of NATO transformation efforts to meet the new threats facing the alliance.
The NRF will consist of a specific, rotational pool of national air, land, and maritime forces drawn from the new NATO Force Structure and organized under a rotational Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters (CJTF HQ). It will plan and train for rapid deployment with assigned forces under a CJTF HQ. Its exercise program and joint training would focus on those units that will be participating in an upcoming NRF rotation so they can be certified as ready for rapid deployment under the CJTF’s command by the time of their rotation.

NATO is currently developing a comprehensive concept for the NRF on the lines of the U.S. proposal. As a major thrust of this work, the NATO Military Committee and NATO military planners have been especially active in developing the associated requirements and standards that will provide the basis for the Force’s preparation, training and certification. NATO Defense Ministers will receive a report on all this concept development work at their meeting this June. Work is progressing toward initial operational capability for training by October 2004 and full operational capability by October 2006.

Senator LEVIN. Fair enough.

Then my last question relates to the testimony about Russia.

Chairman WARNER. Could I interrupt just to say again how much I appreciate the attendance by these distinguished witnesses this morning. I think that our membership on this committee is of the opinion that we have received very strong testimony in support of the President’s initiative. I anticipate that the Senate will act very favorably and hopefully shortly on this matter.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Secretary FEITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LEVIN [presiding]. Thanks.

My final question then relates to NATO-Russia relations. There was established, as you indicated, I believe, a NATO-Russia Council at the Rome Summit in May 2002. All of the NATO allies and Russia agreed to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action “at 20” as equal partners. Can you, either or both of you, tell us how that new council is working out? Can you give us some examples of joint actions that have been carried out?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Yes, sir. “So far, so good” is what I would say. As I testified to another Senator, just to make clear that this “at 20” arrangement is not a back door to NATO membership for Russia. It is not a veto over what NATO could do.

But I think actually the NATO-Russia Council has met a number of its expectations. It is working today in areas of combating terrorism. There is a joint working group on the possibilities of peacekeeping. There have been a number of exercises, Senator, and I will get you the number, in the areas of civil emergency planning, which have worked actually quite well and people have been satisfied with, and groups looking at the possibilities of working together on nonproliferation.

[The information referred to follows:]
Continued military-to-military cooperation and interoperability between NATO and Russian forces is the next key step in deepening the NATO-Russia relationship. Following upon the planned exchanges and seminars that represent the first phase of the interoperability project, we plan to pursue tabletop and field exercises to establish a productive tradition of working and learning together on the ground.

Senator Levin. Secretary Feith, do you have anything to add to that?

Secretary Feith. Yes, sir. The NATO-Russia Council adopted a work program for 2003 that includes work in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear preparedness, combating terrorism, military-to-military cooperation, and, as was just said, the civil emergency preparedness exercises. There was a civil emergency planning exercise in Noginsk that has already taken place and there was a concept paper done on peacekeeping operations. There has also been work on terrorist threat assessments and missile defense.

Senator Levin. Thank you.

I just picked up when I came back on the end of a comment you were making, Ambassador Grossman, about the response to this committee about the consensus rule and making it clear that you are going to let us know whether or not there is going to be formal consideration proposed of that rule, and that does not mean that you personally, for instance, favor any change in that rule, basically.

Ambassador Grossman. That is correct, yes, sir.

Senator Levin. I just wanted to be clear that there are two questions that you will get back to us on relative to the NATO charter. One is the consensus rule, but the other one is the lack of the ability to suspend a member who is no longer in compliance with the fundamentals in the charter, obedience to the rule of law, free markets, and democratic values, and so forth. So that you will get back to us on both of those.

Ambassador Grossman. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

Yes, sir. Immediately after the hearing, I will consult with Ambassador Burns and we will propose a way to raise this at NATO. After Ambassador Burns and I have spoken, I will report to you on both issues.

Senator Levin. Thank you both for your testimony. I join our chairman in saying that this is a very valuable hearing, but also that I think it is all of our hopes that the matter of the accession to NATO and the treaty ratification come before the Senate as quickly as possible. I am sure that some of the issues that we have talked about here will be raised during that debate, even though they are not directed at the new members, they are directed at the principle of it. So that your answers to those questions should come before that debate begins, because that will help us in the debate.

Ambassador Grossman. I understand that, sir.

Senator Levin. Thank you both, and we will stand adjourned.

[Question for the record with answer supplied follows:]

**QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON**

**CAPTAIN SCOTT SPEICHER**

1. Senator Bill Nelson, Secretary Feith, what are you doing to plan, organize, and manage the investigation necessary to resolve the fate of Captain Scott Speicher in postwar Iraq? I would appreciate both classified and unclassified answers to this question.
Secretary Feith. The Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) is responsible for coordinating the U.S. Government effort to resolve the fate of Captain Michael Scott Speicher in postwar Iraq. DPMO leads the interagency effort to account to Captain Speicher, to include planning, organizing, and managing the ongoing search.

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee adjourned.]